A Lack of Resolution by Zaring, David
Emory Law Journal 
Volume 60 Issue 1 
2010 
A Lack of Resolution 
David Zaring 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj 
Recommended Citation 
David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 Emory L. J. 97 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol60/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
ZARING GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010 11:42 AM 
 
A LACK OF RESOLUTION 
David Zaring* 
[T]here is a clear need for a new “resolution authority.” 
—Paul A. Volcker1 
How few there are who have courage enough to own their Faults, or 
resolution enough to mend them! 
—Benjamin Franklin2 
ABSTRACT 
The failure to resolve—that is, impose a quick death penalty on—enormous 
financial intermediaries such as Lehman Brothers and AIG damaged the 
ability of the government to respond to the financial crisis.  But expanding 
resolution authority to cover new systemically significant institutions—which 
is one of the lynchpins of financial regulatory reform—poses a problem of 
legitimacy with constitutional implications, as resolution authority is usually 
exercised with almost no predeprivation process and little postdeprivation 
compensation.  At the same time, banking regulators have failed, every time 
they have been given more resolution authority, to exercise that authority when 
it is needed. 
This Article reassesses resolution authority.  It proposes (1) domestic 
solutions to protect against government overreach and (2) an international 
context to deal with the problem of underreach.  First, it proposes that the 
government make an ex ante public list of potentially nationalizable 
institutions and, ex post, provide the owners of seized institutions a brief 
window in which to buy their institutions back from the regulators who took 
 
 * Assistant Professor, Legal Studies Department, Wharton School of Business.  Thanks to Douglas 
Arner, Matt Bodie, Larry Cunningham, Steven Davidoff, Adam Levitin, Patricia McCoy, David Skeel, 
workshops at the University of Connecticut Law School, Hong Kong University, and the Annual Meeting of 
the Law and Society Association, to Paul Fattaruso, Justin Simard, and Andrew Dressel for research 
assistance, and to the Zicklin Center at Wharton for research support. 
 1 Efforts to Control High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s 
Economic Recovery Advisory Board). 
 2 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 87 (Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. 2007) (1732). 
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them.  This proposal would add both a process check and a market check to 
this most severe form of decisionmaking.  At the same time, this Article also 
proposes internationalizing the context of the decision to use resolution 
authority by including expert multinational committees of regulators in the 
decision.  Because these regulators are somewhat insulated from ordinary 
domestic politics, this twofold approach is more likely to encourage the 
appropriate resolution of the largest institutions than any solely domestic 
approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has regulated the government’s “power to destroy” 
since 1819.3  But Congress and the Constitution have protected the interests of 
the insolvent by permitting them fresh starts and granting them a variety of 
rights through bankruptcy for even longer.4  Because debtor protection goes 
hand in hand with the destruction of the interests of creditors, the fresh start 
and the power to destroy have been on uneasy terms ever since. 
Consider the fate of big, struggling financial intermediaries like the 
Lehman Brothers and AIGs of the most recent financial crisis.  During that 
crisis, these institutions all but collapsed, at tremendous economic cost.  They 
could have been destroyed, or the government could have saved them or given 
them some other sort of fresh start.  This sort of fresh start might have been 
accomplished by invoking its resolution authority.  Resolution authority is the 
polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either shutting them 
down or selling them off for the best possible price.  Resolution is meant to be 
implemented before contagion sets in and the institutions’ counterparties, 
including customers, traders, and even competitors, also fail, either through 
panic (which is not the fault of the counterparties) or poor risk management 
(which is, but still may exacerbate a crisis).  It is a particular kind of instant 
bankruptcy, destroying the interests of some creditors quickly and 
unmercifully, while giving others, especially the bank’s depositors, a fresh and 
happy start. 
Well-deployed resolution authority could mean that financial cataclysms of 
the sort threatened by Lehman and AIG would not bother ordinary Americans; 
their banking needs would be unaffected by the occasional smoothly resolved 
collapse of an institution in which they may have placed their trust, along with 
a dollop of high-quality deposit insurance.5  It might, at least in theory, stop 
financial crises before they start. 
 
 3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 391 (1819) (“A right to tax without limit or control, 
is essentially a power to destroy.”). 
 4 The Constitution contains a Bankruptcy Clause granting the federal government the power to act in 
bankruptcy.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  Congress passed the first bankruptcy act in 1800.  See Bankruptcy 
Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).  That statute did not provide for voluntary proceedings, 
however.  Congress passed the first act providing for voluntary bankruptcy in 1841 and added to the provisions 
in 1867.  See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 521 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 
9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). 
 5 Ideally, resolution authority would be used, and has been used, to perfect the “weekend bankruptcy,” 
in which a financial institution would fail on Friday and reopen on Monday under new management and with 
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However, neither Lehman nor AIG were subjected to this sort of discipline.  
Was that lack of resolution the reason why the financial crisis was so severe? 
Congress and President Obama seem to think so, and in the wake of the 
crisis, they have passed and signed legislation designed to enhance and 
broaden the government’s power to destroy through resolution.  Properly 
conceived, resolution authority looks like a valuable exercise of government 
power, and it is a cornerstone of the government’s ongoing efforts to keep the 
financial system stable.6  But it is not a panacea, and this Article explores its 
problems in the context of the other ways that the government can exercise the 
power to destroy and the power to grant a fresh start. 
Resolution authority’s problems are twofold.  The first is that it is a power 
to destroy par excellence, and those sorts of powers need to be limited—a need 
particularly worth considering at a time when Congress has dramatically 
expanded the government’s resolution authority through the Dodd-Frank Act 
reforming financial regulation.  The second is that the government, perhaps 
aware of the dramatic nature of the act, has proven to be loath to exercise its 
power to destroy.  This Article proposes an approach that would deal with both 
problems, one that differs from the new sort of authority promulgated by 
Congress in Dodd-Frank.  It suggests a way to cabin the power to destroy and a 
way to ensure that the government exercises that power when it should. 
 
new signs on the door.  The same customers would remain in the books, however, their savings entirely intact 
and their financial relationships smoothly shifted from an insolvent old institution to a solvent new one.  The 
cost would be borne by the institution’s old managers and owners, who would be fired or wiped out; its 
nondepositor creditors, who will take a haircut; and the government, which will cover any shortfall.  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has placed its guidelines for resolution authority on its website.  
FDIC, DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY: BOARD RESOLUTION (2002), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/ 
matrix/index.html. 
 6 Indeed, the needs and risks of resolution (or its alternative, uncontrolled bank failures) might fairly be 
construed as the basis for the rest of the regulatory enterprise of banking law, including the mission to keep 
banks generally “safe and sound,” the imposition of frequent examinations and visitations to ensure that 
insolvency will not be a shock, and everything else that the government does to oversee financial 
intermediation.  As such, and in light of the recent financial crisis, resolution authority has been the subject of 
a growing literature.  For a view that resolution authority should be paired with a very large reserve fund, see 
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case 
for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 374, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636456 (proposing the expansion of 
resolution authority to firms not classified as “banks” as part of a plan to address systematic failures in the 
financial system); see also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 
(2010) (criticizing increases in resolution authority for institutionalizing the use of bailouts); Onnig H. 
Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777 
(2010) (calling for industry participation in resolution decisions). 
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Getting resolution right is worth doing; we will have another financial 
crisis, and soon.  The World Bank has identified 112 episodes of systemic 
banking crises in 93 countries since the 1970s, and American banking crises 
appear to come along once every decade or so.7  These crises all feature 
institutions that go bust seemingly overnight, all calling for resolution, 
bankruptcy, or a bailout. 
And the alternative to resolution reform—which in the United States 
amounts to unclear resolution authority with inadequate encouragement of its 
use—is an unhappy one.  During the last financial crisis, the government 
occasionally exhibited what the shareholders of Washington Mutual, the 
largest thrift8 in the country at the time, thought was a lack of control, 
demonstrated by the government’s seizing and resolving a bank when a strong 
case could be made for its continued solvency.9 
But mostly, it evinced what we might call a lack of resolution.  In some 
cases the government organized deals, on the fly, to handle insolvency, as 
when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department forced the sale of one 
investment bank that they did not regulate—Bear Stearns—to a commercial 
bank,10 despite a lack of obvious authority to intervene in investment banking 
and through some rather extraordinary cajoling and fundraising.11  It did not 
resolve this institution. 
Sometimes the government simply bailed out the insolvent institution.  It 
did so for the credit default swap titan AIG, which it also did not resolve.12  
 
 7 See Patrick Honohan & Daniela Klingebiel, Controlling the Fiscal Costs of Banking Crises 3 (The 
World Bank Dev. Research Grp. Fin. & Fin. Sector Strategy & Policy Dep’t, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 2441, 2000). 
 8 “Thrifts” are savings and loan institutions (S&Ls), which are obligated to devote a percentage of their 
loans to financing housing. 
 9 See Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.  For an overview of the controversy surrounding this arguably overhasty resolution, see 
Felix Salmon, Revisiting WaMu, REUTERS BLOG (May 26, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2009/05/26/revisiting-wamu/. 
 10 Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2008, at A1. 
 11 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (describing the dealmaking process). 
 12 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 943 (2009); David A. 
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 12 (2009).  For a first draft 
of the AIG bailout history, see Monica Langley et al., Bad Bets and Cash Crunch Pushed Ailing AIG to Brink, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The rot stemmed largely from losses in a unit that sold a complex kind of 
derivative, called a credit-default swap, designed to protect investors against default in an array of assets, 
including subprime mortgages.”). 
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And it both bailed out and seized the big secondary mortgage market makers 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing both institutions under government 
receiverships while taking over their massive debt burdens.13  The government 
also bailed out most of the other large players in the financial system even 
before figuring out whether they were solvent or not.14  Those bailouts, of 
course, were unpopular and expensive propositions for the taxpayers,15 which 
makes it all the more confusing that, as Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K. 
Tarullo has observed, the government in most cases (but not for Washington 
Mutual, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns) “selected the bailout option” in 
lieu of bankruptcy or resolution.16 
Legal constraints may have played a role in what the government did, not 
that the basis for its financial sector choices was ever entirely clear.  The 
government might have suspected, for example, that the failure of Lehman 
Brothers could be catastrophic, but concluded that it was powerless to save the 
investment bank because Lehman was structured not as a “bank,” but as an 
institution that owned a bank and various other subsidiaries.17  Such “holding 
companies” were not obviously covered by the government’s then extant 
 
 13 See Avni P. Patel, Recent Development, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008-2009—
The Bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 21, 21–22 (2008); Carol J. Perry, 
Note, Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (2009). 
 14 See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 15 See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Op-Ed., Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A27. 
 16 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Institute of International Bankers 
Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/tarullo20091110a.htm. 
 17 On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed a plenary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.  Press 
Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces It Intends to File Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Petition (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_ 
chapter11_announce.pdf; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of 
Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.  As a “truly global firm with over 7,000 legal entities in more than 
40 countries,” Lehman’s insolvency “resulted in over 75 separate and distinct bankruptcy proceedings.”  Press 
Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Lehman Group of Companies Signs Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol 
(May 26, 2009), available at http://documents.epiq11.com/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentPk=400A7F75-
7140-4BC3-990E-4B9733B51CF2.  The number of proceedings related to the number of legal entities under 
the Lehman umbrella, see id., and the Lehman bankruptcy therefore did not operate under the auspice of 
Chapter 15, whereby a particular debtor would file a plenary proceeding in one jurisdiction and seek 
recognition from United States courts.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2006).  Note that “[t]he drafters of the 
provisions seem to have contemplated that troubled brokerages [such as Lehman] would be liquidated in 
Chapter 7.”  Skeel, supra note 12, at 4.  Lehman, however, successfully filed under Chapter 11 by using a 
strategy similar to other brokerages in the past: “fil[ing] a Chapter 11 petition for its holding company, and 
ke[eping] its brokerage subsidiary out of bankruptcy until it had time to move all of the customer accounts.”  
Id. 
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resolution authority.18  (However, this conclusion must have surprised the 
shareholders of quasi-resolved similar institutions like Bear Stearns, which was 
structured as a similar sort of holding company.)19 
Without resolution, the government can always leave institutions like 
Lehman to bankruptcy, and indeed, it did exactly that.  But bankruptcy can 
coincide with serious destabilization of the credit markets, as Lehman’s 
insolvency did for its money market fund counterparties.20  The results of the 
Lehman bankruptcy were ugly: as credit markets froze up, a money market 
fund holding Lehman debt “broke the buck” and then failed, leading to a panic 
in that market sector and general disappearance of commercial credit.21  
Lehman’s failure also turned into a multinational mess, with parallel, 
 
 18 All of this is quite controversial as a matter of legal interpretation.  See Joe Nocera & Edmund L. 
Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a Crisis Raged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A1 (presenting Treasury 
Secretary Henry Paulson’s argument that “the Federal Reserve could bail out Lehman with a loan only if the 
bank had enough good assets to serve as collateral, which it did not”); David Zaring, Richard Posner Has 
Some Questions, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 30, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/07/colleen-
baker-points-me-to-richard-posners-a-list-of-questions-for-legal-academics-and-he-thinks-weve-been-remiss-
about-answ.html.  It is unclear whether its limitations in this area are attributable to a statutory bar or the 
complexity of the task.  As one senior Treasury official told The New Yorker: “It’s one thing to [take over] a 
car company, which isn’t relying on daily decisions by its counterparties . . . .  With a financial institution, if 
there were a long period of uncertainty, customers, counterparties, creditors, and trading partners would flee, 
and the ultimate bill would be substantial.”  Ryan Lizza, The Contrarian; Sheila Bair and the White House 
Financial Debate, NEW YORKER, July 6, 2009, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rachelle 
Younglai & Kim Dixon, Lehman’s Fuld: Where Was Our Bailout?, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4954DL20081006 (noting that Fuld, the former head of Lehman 
Brothers, will wonder “[u]ntil the day they put [him] in the ground . . . why [Lehman was] the only one” not to 
get a bailout (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The distinction has hurt regulators before.  Indeed, Hal Scott 
has observed that BCCI was a problem because Luxemburg, its regulator, only had oversight power over the 
bank, but could do nothing about the holding company, to which the bank itself was trivial in comparison.  
HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 180–81 (16th ed. 2009). 
 19 For the government’s view of a possible distinction between Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns at the 
time of its decision, see Paulson Insists No Bailout for Lehman, DIRECTORSHIP.COM (Sept. 12, 2008), 
http://www.directorship.com/paulson-insists-no-bailout-for-lehman/ (“There are two things that make this 
different from Bear Stearns.  The market’s been aware of the situation for a long time and has had time to 
prepare.  Second, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility was created by the Fed to allow time for an orderly 
process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20 This argument is controversial.  Some scholars argue that, employed consistently, bankruptcy is a 
desirable mechanism for culling the value from failing institutions in a cost-effective manner.  See, e.g., Skeel, 
supra note 12. 
 21 But see David A. Skeel, The Lehman Myth in the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 
6, 2009, 2:00 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/dealbook-dialogue-david-skeelthe-lehman-
myth/ (“The claim that Lehman’s default caused the chaos that came afterward is similarly dubious.”). 
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competing bankruptcy proceedings in the United Kingdom and the United 
States.22 
But the bailout option is just as unpalatable.23  Apart from its political 
unpopularity, AIG initially cost the taxpayers more money than did the failure 
of any other company; indeed, it has cost the taxpayers more than the annual 
budgets of many beloved federal departments, such as the Departments of 
Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Justice, combined.24  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together required a similar magnitude of 
commitment of government resources for their bailouts.25 
Resolution authority is one way to disincentive the bailout, while avoiding 
bankruptcy.  It could be fairer than picking winners through government 
assistance, especially if it gave the government the power to resolve the largest 
financial institutions.26  After all, with the exception of Washington Mutual 
 
 22 Bankruptcies do not always go smoothly.  David Skeel and Kenneth Ayotte have described the 
Lehman bankruptcy as promising in some ways and problematic in others.  See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 6, 
at 481, 482 (observing that “Lehman could hardly have been less prepared for Chapter 11,” but describing 
certain successes of the Lehman bankruptcy process including the fact that “faced with extreme time pressure, 
buyers materialized, and Lehman quickly sold its viable subsidiaries, allowing them to remain in business 
under different ownership”).  Although the multinational nature of bankruptcies is often thought to be a 
problem, Ayotte and Skeel describe the European aspect of the Lehman bankruptcy as workable, stating 
simply that “[i]ts operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia were bought by Nomura, a large Japanese 
brokerage firm.”  Id. at 481.  Skeel thinks that many of the problems of bankruptcy arose because of the 
expectation of a bailout.  He has suggested that Lehman’s bankruptcy was largely a problem because the 
rescue of Bear Stearns created expectations of a ubiquitous government safety net.  See Too Big to Fail—The 
Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (written testimony of 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School) (“When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, 
no one even knew who Lehman owed money to and who the counterparties on its derivatives contracts were.  
AIG behaved in very similar fashion.  These responses are perfectly understandable given both companies’ 
assumption—an assumption shared by nearly everyone as a result of the Bear Stearns bailout—that regulators 
would rescue any big, troubled financial institution.”). 
 23 See Tarullo, supra note 16. 
 24 Alice Gomstyn, AIG Price Tag: $1,400 Per Taxpayer Family, ABC NEWS/MONEY (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6990305&page=1.  The government made $180 billion 
available to AIG.  Sharona Coutts & Paul Kiel, How Big Is AIG’s Bailout . . . Really?, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 
2009, 1:46 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-big-is-aigs-bailout-really-707.  Meanwhile, the 
budgets of the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Veterans Affairs totaled $134.7 
billion as of 2010.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 85, 95, 117 (2010) 
(HUD budget is $48.5 billion, Justice budget is $29.2 billion, and Veterans Affairs budget is $57 billion). 
 25 Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1 Trillion Worst Case, 
BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-13/fannie-freddie-fix-
expands-to-160-billion-with-worst-case-at-1-trillion.html. 
 26 In bailouts, by contrast, creditors get their entire investment back, while the government bears the 
brunt of the failure.  Consider, for instance, the government bailout of AIG.  There, the equity holders went to 
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and arguably Lehman Brothers, during the last crisis, large banks got bailouts, 
but many smaller institutions were subjected to resolution (indeed the list of 
failed institutions is well into triple digits).27 
Accordingly, developing the power to take large financial firms like 
Lehman Brothers or AIG through resolution without resorting to bankruptcy 
court is a cardinal goal of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reform of financial regulation.  
The Dodd-Frank Act has sought to prevent the government from bailing out a 
failing institution.28  And, perhaps most importantly, it has dramatically 
expanded resolution authority to cover the sorts of financial companies not 
clearly within the ranks of regulated banks.29 
But where should this expansive resolution authority end?  Should the 
ability to quickly nationalize and fail apply to financial intermediaries like 
hedge funds?  One powerful international organization of banking regulators 
 
zero while creditors were paid out at—rather scandalously, in the view of many—100 cents on the dollar.  See 
Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp, New York Fed Caved in to AIG Creditors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at 
C1. 
 27 Eric Dash, Small Banks Fail at Growing Rate, Straining F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 28 Although this Article will not discuss at length Congress’s efforts to prevent the government from 
bailing out banks again, they are worth noting.  For example, Congress has amended the Federal Reserve’s 
ability to open its discount window to individual institutions, limiting such assistance to a “program or facility 
with broad-based eligibility.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 716, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  Section 214 of the Act prohibits the use 
of taxpayer funds for bailouts.  Id. § 214.  Further, Title XIII of the Act is titled the “Pay It Back Act” and 
requires the Treasury to return the bailout money granted to it under the TARP.  Id.  Rather hopefully, 
President Barack Obama has declared that “[b]ecause of this law, the American people will never again be 
asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.”  Ross Colvin, Obama Signs Sweeping Wall Street Overhaul 
into Law, REUTERS (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66K1QR20100722. 
 29 The new rules on resolution authority comprise Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.  For examples of 
discussions of the push for more authority, see Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) 
(written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg335.htm (“We must build a system in which individual firms, no 
matter how large or important, can fail without risking catastrophic damage to the economy.”); Albert Bozzo, 
US Is Seeking Tougher Powers in Too-Big-to-Fail Legislation, CNBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2009, 12:43 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/33314791.  It would be incorrect to characterize resolution authority as another 
example of regulation-by-deal, though sometimes it is consummated with a deal on the fly, as was the 
government’s response to the financial crisis at times.  See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 11 and 
accompanying text.  Dealmaking is private ordering, and there is nothing private about the authority invoked 
by the government to wrap up failed institutions.  The FDIC has a preset program, is accustomed to dealing 
with failing institutions, and does not hire legal counsel to negotiate when it seizes a bank.  See FED. DEPOSIT 
INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK (2003) [hereinafter FDIC HANDBOOK], available at http://www.fdic. 
gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/index.html.  It relies on powers explicitly granted to it by statute.  See 12 
U.S.C. § 1822 (2006).  So seizure is not private ordering; it is instead public ordering. 
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has concluded that it should.30  Market participants like private equity funds?  
The European Union has proposed bringing private equity within the ambit of 
prudential financial supervision—an ambit that probably would include the 
power to seize and fail such institutions.31  Should job-producing commercial 
companies, such as, say, auto manufacturers, be subject to resolution authority, 
lest the government be tempted into expensive bailouts of its national 
champions?  The United States has a rich tradition of bailing out these sorts of 
manufacturers; more resolution authority, it is thought, could reduce the 
temptation to do so in the future.32 
These examples illustrate the problems of resolution authority, including 
old problems of constitutional law and the propriety of agency action.  The 
right way to broaden the government’s ability to destroy through resolution 
would address resolution authority’s legitimacy, both as a matter of policy and 
as a matter of legality.  An even better solution would pair enhanced resolution 
authority with restrictions that promise to protect against its misuse. 
This Article argues that a revised resolution authority with a scope limited 
to a list of publicly identified institutions would ensure that the government’s 
power to destroy is not overly broad.  Moreover, although Congress and 
administrative lawyers rarely turn to markets to solve governance problems, a 
market check would do a great deal of good in ensuring that resolution 
authority, once deployed, is deployed for good reason and on reasoned terms.  
Permitting buybacks of resolved institutions—or at least giving the owners of 
those institutions the chance to make public bids—would be a salutary check 
on overzealous resolution. 
Better resolution authority, however, is not only a matter of potential 
government overreaching.  The parlous history of the exercise of resolution 
authority during financial crises is also a case study of repeated government 
failures to act.33  Banks not taken through the quick bankruptcy process 
 
 30 See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (recounting efforts of the Basel Committee to improve 
resolution authority in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis). 
 31 Friederich K. Kübler, European Initiatives for the Regulation of Nonbank Financial Institutions 1–2 
(Dec. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (summarizing EU action in this area). 
 32 Phillip Longman, Washington’s Turnaround Artists, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 14, 14–18; 
see also Joseph R. Mason & Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big to Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial 
Incentives: The Case of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry During the 
Great Depression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49 (Benton E. 
Gup ed., 2004). 
 33 Robert Teitelman, Transactions: March 8, 2010, THE DEAL (Mar. 5, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://www. 
thedeal.com/newsweekly/community/transactions/transactions:-march-8,-2010.php (“Resolution authority 
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overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have required 
expensive bailouts, as with Continental Illinois in the early 1980s34 and Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, Citibank, and AIG during the recent financial crisis.35 
Even worse, institutions that should be resolved but are not can become 
“zombie banks”—insolvent but taking risks, losing lending discipline, and 
piling up losses because the government is unwilling to close them.  Japan’s 
“lost decade” of zero growth in the 1990s often has been attributed to the 
Japanese government’s failure to come to grips with the essential insolvency of 
its financial sector.36  And the expense of resolution may also keep the 
government from exercising its power until matters are very bad.  One World 
Bank study has estimated that the resolution costs of most banking crises since 
1980 have amounted to more than 10% of the originating country’s GDP.37  
How can we ensure that the government will exercise its resolution authority 
when it ought to do so? 
It is here that one of the most complicated problems of resolving a financial 
institution—the cross-border problem—might illuminate the way to proceed.  
The financial institutions that really matter—the ones with international 
exposure, of the sort that Lehman Brothers had during the recent financial 
crisis—create the prospect of incredibly complicated bankruptcies, involving 
multiple jurisdictions with little reason to cooperate when dividing the assets of 
a collapsed multinational. 
Financial regulators have known since the 1970s that their big banks, if 
they fail, can create a dangerous chain of international dominoes.38  They have 
 
resembles proactive bubble defense: The optimal time to use it is before the anticipated corpse turns blue.  But 
if Paulson had shuttered Lehman right after Bear collapsed, would he be praised, pilloried or prosecuted like a 
dog?”). 
 34 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 36 See HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 285–91 
(15th ed. 2008) (describing causes of the Japanese financial crisis in the 1990s). 
 37 The study arose out of the World Bank’s efforts to create a comprehensive financial crisis database.  
See Honohan & Klingebiel, supra note 7 (“By one count, 112 episodes of systemic banking crises occurred in 
93 countries since the late 1970s and 51 borderline crises were recorded in 46 countries.”). 
 38 On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced Bank Herstatt into liquidation, which left without remedy 
a number of banks that had released payment of German marks to Herstatt in Frankfurt in exchange for United 
States dollars that were to be delivered in New York.  3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1970-2001, at 20 (2001).  The 
British-Israel Bank, based in the United Kingdom, and the Franklin National Bank, based in the United States, 
also failed.  See ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL BANKS: ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
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accordingly, since that time, met in Basel, Switzerland, in an effort to 
coordinate approaches to the financial externalities that would otherwise spill 
across borders.39 
And, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is with the so-called Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision that some of the furthest reaching of the 
proposed financial reforms have appeared.40  For example, the possibility of 
leverage caps for banks—rules that will make them smaller—have originated 
with the Basel Committee rather than any domestic regulator.41  The 
Committee is insulated from some of the domestic pressures that have deterred 
regulators from pulling the resolution trigger.  It is a place where national 
regulators meet and jawbone and act like experts, rather than like captured, 
chary regulators.42  And it is an institution committed to developing an 
approach to cross-border insolvencies. 
This Article posits that it is via this peer pressure that domestic regulators 
best can be encouraged to exercise their resolution authority.43  It is only 
through the Basel process of peer review and insulation from domestic 
lobbying pressures44 that United States regulators will be able to force 
themselves to do some of the difficult work of resolving financial institutions. 
 
THE BASLE ACCORD 4–5 (1991) (discussing the history surrounding the establishment of the Basel 
Committee). 
 39 See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 479–81 
(2010) [hereinafter Zaring, Crisis Performance]. 
 40 However, the G-20 has also been a source of such proposals.  See id. at 493–99. 
 41 Though the Basel Committee did not cover itself in glory during the crisis, see David Zaring, Three 
Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAW. 211, 215–17 (2009) [hereinafter Zaring, Three 
Challenges], it has been the delegate of the G-20 for passing new tough rules on banks in the past.  And even if 
it is not a perfect solution to the problems of global financial crises (and the point of this Article is not to 
suggest that it is), the Committee may be a place to coordinate the impetus to, in fact, exercise resolution 
authority over the particularly big international financial institutions.  The Basel Committee, for example, has 
urged stronger leverage caps than the 15:1 ratio provided by the Dodd-Frank financial reforms.  See infra note 
221 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Basel Committee’s ambitions. 
 42 See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 43 The United States has not always embraced the Basel Committee to the fullest extent; it has 
implemented the Committee’s capital adequacy accords slowly, on occasion, and strong-armed the Committee 
in certain directions on others.  See DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 36–66 (2007).  But the SEC, for example, used Basel II for its most 
sophisticated investment banks (albeit with disastrous results).  For a review by the former SEC chair of the 
program, see Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Congressional 
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
230.htm. 
 44 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
547, 555–60 (2005). 
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It is by no means a panacea to turn to informal, relatively unregulated 
international organizations to discipline domestic regulators to exercise their 
strongest powers.45  But its real world advantages probably mean that this 
international approach is the source of the most likely solutions to the 
problems involved with getting any domestic government to exercise the 
powers that it actually possesses, and then using insulation to free up the 
expertise that has always been, at bottom, the justification for administrative 
agencies. 
In what follows, this Article first provides an overview of existing 
resolution authority and considers some proposals to broaden this authority in 
the wake of the financial crisis.  It then considers the legal impediments to such 
a broadening.  Finally, it offers a solution that might ensure that resolution 
authority, when deployed, is deployed usefully. 
I. THE CURRENT LACK OF RESOLUTION 
A. Existing Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis 
This section of the Article surveys the history and law of resolution 
authority. The goals are to show how the government’s seizure powers have 
evolved over time, what they look like today, and how the Dodd-Frank Act 
will change them.  This section also surveys the way the government actually 
exercises its takeover authority, with a focus on the recent financial crisis.  As 
this Article demonstrates, and as the recent financial crisis exemplifies, the 
FDIC, the agency responsible for taking over banks, acts procyclically.  That 
is, the worse the economic conditions, the more banks it fails.  Although that 
may be an inevitable fact, it has nonetheless been bemoaned by economists 
hoping for a more countercyclical regulatory approach that might smooth out 
disruptions to the financial system caused by hard times and failing 
counterparties.46  Moreover, the early warning system put into place after the 
last big domestic financial crisis (known as “prompt corrective action” or 
“PCA” authority) was designed to cajole regulators into closing banks quickly 
and more countercyclically, and to “place foam on the runway” to make 
 
 45 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998) [hereinafter Zaring, International Law]. 
 46 For a review of the issues and concerns, see Mariya Deryugina, Shaping Global Financial Reform: A 
Symposium for Private and Public Sector Leaders, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 683 (2009); Daniel Indiviglio, 
The Senate Plan’s Resolution Authority, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 11, 2009, 10:50 AM), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/business/archive/2009/11/the-senate-plans-resolution-authority/29972/. 
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resolution easier to do.  Yet this system has not been used.  Indeed, the FDIC 
issued prompt corrective action orders in only 19% of the cases in which it 
ultimately failed banks during 2009, the year that marks the apogee of the 
recent crisis. 
1. A Brief History of Resolution Authority 
This subsection of the Article briefly tours some of the government’s 
rescues and seizures of financial institutions before the most recent financial 
crisis.  It pairs past resolutions and bailouts with the statutory authority—
designed to limit the prospect of future crises—given to the government in 
their aftermath.47 
Today, resolution authority is managed by the FDIC.48  But the government 
power that it represents stretches back much further; the seizure of property by 
federal marshals, for example, or the appointment of bankruptcy trustees, dates 
back to the nineteenth century.49 
Apart from its longstanding ability to disempower creditors through the 
complex process of bankruptcy, Congress has in the past used insolvency to 
adjust the relationship between creditors and debtors in other ways.  During the 
Great Depression, it uniformly modified farm mortgages—a controversial 
interference with the contractual rights of creditors, but one ultimately upheld 
 
 47 The FDIC received its resolution authority through the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).  12 
U.S.C. § 1819 (2006).  This authority was expanded in the FDIA’s amendments, passed after the S&L crisis, 
known as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  12 U.S.C. § 1824 
(2006).  However, that authority is not the only basis on which the government either has exercised its power 
to destroy, or elected to save, businesses.  S&Ls are organizations that accept savings deposits and make 
personal loans to their members.  A combination of lax regulation, poor oversight, rising interest rates, risky 
decisionmaking, and declining commercial real estate values caused more than 700 S&Ls to fail in the 1980s 
and 1990s, as is discussed in a bit more detail later in this Article.  1 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DIV. OF 
RESEARCH & STATISTICS, HISTORY OF THE 80S: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 167−88 (1997).  The costs of the 
collapse were massive: $160 billion with $124 billion coming from federal taxpayers.  Timothy Curry & Lynn 
Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 
(2000). 
 48 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. § 1824 (2006). 
 49 Though the government’s bankruptcy power is subject to the Takings Clause, this rarely creates a 
practical limitation.  See generally James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in 
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983) (discussing reasons why the Takings Clause has little real effect on the 
government’s bankruptcy power). 
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by the post-Lochner Supreme Court.50  And Congress occasionally has bailed 
out individual debtors through legislation, making good on its obligations with 
taxpayer funds.  This action also has been upheld as constitutional, even when 
accompanied with resolution, bankruptcy, and other pain for the creditors and 
owners of the debtor.51  In addition to reorganizing (and partly nationalizing) 
the nation’s rail companies, the government became involved in the aircraft 
business when it rescued Lockheed in 1971 with a $250 million loan.52  It has 
bailed out Chrysler twice, first at a cost of $1.5 billion in 1980 and second at a 
cost of $1.6 billion in 2009.53  There is no question, then, that the power to 
intervene through resolution, bailout, or bankruptcy, in a variety of ways and 
as a basic matter, has been understood as within the government’s legal 
powers. 
But the government most often rescues or resolves banks through the 
FDIC, which is the current resolver of last resort.  This process has evolved 
into a seizure with little process or recourse.  A well-known example is 
Continental Illinois, which was the seventh-largest bank in the United States 
when it was both bailed out and wound up at a cost of $1.8 billion, with serious 
consequences to the shareholders and employees of the institution.54 
 
 50 See Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (holding 
that the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act did not unreasonably modify mortgagees’ rights and 
was thus valid).  The first version of this statute, however, was held to be unconstitutional.  See Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935). 
 51 See Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). 
 52 BARRY RITHOLTZ, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND 
SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 11 (2009). 
 53 Id.  For a discussion of the second Chrysler bailout, see Martin Crutsinger, US Set to Lose $1.6b on 
Loan to Chrysler, Treasury Reports, BOS. GLOBE, May 18, 2010, at B8. 
 54 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Continental Illinois and “Too Big to Fail,” in 1 HISTORY OF THE 
EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 
1990S, at 235, 244 (1997) (“[T]hree bank regulatory agencies decided to provide a $2 billion assistance 
package to Continental: the FDIC provided $1.5 billion, and participated [sic] an additional $500 million to a 
group of commercial banks.  The capital infusion was in the form of interest-bearing subordinated notes at a 
variable rate 100 basis points higher than that on one-year Treasury bills.  The Federal Reserve stated that it 
would meet any liquidity needs Continental might have, and a group of 24 major United States banks agreed to 
provide more than $5.3 billion in funding on an unsecured basis while a permanent solution was sought.  In 
what was perhaps the most controversial move by the regulators, the FDIC promised to protect all of 
Continental’s depositors and other general creditors, regardless of the $100,000 limit on deposit insurance.  
The assistance package was to remain in place while the regulators searched for a permanent solution to 
Continental’s problems.”). 
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Resolution authority was first given to the FDIC through the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA).55  This authority was enhanced after the 
FDIC’s failure to make active use of that authority during the last great 
financial housing crisis—the S&L crisis of the 1980s.  The blame for this crisis 
has been assigned to macroeconomic factors (rising interest rates at the end of 
the 1970s devastated the balance sheets of thrifts locked into long-term, low-
yield mortgages, often with fixed interest rates)56 and the culture of risky, even 
fraudulent, behavior on the part of the thrifts themselves.57  Regulators also 
failed to curtail this behavior through their ordinary supervision.  The result 
was an extraordinarily widespread failure rate across the thrift sector. 
In response to the crisis, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which created the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to 
clean up the savings and loan industry by restoring its health and 
preventing the depletion of its deposit insurance fund.  In order to 
fulfill its duty of restoring liquidity to thrift associations, the RTC 
takes over insolvent S&Ls, sells their assets, and distributes the 
proceeds of the sales to the shareholders.  The RTC’s primary goal is 
to achieve the most cost-effective resolution of the S&L crisis for the 
taxpayers.58 
 
 55 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).  Agency predecessors of the FDIC—including the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Asset Disposition Association (FADA)—had similar resolution 
capabilities, and state financial regulators long exercised resolution authority over state banks that failed within 
their jurisdictions.  Bert Ely, The Resolution Trust Corporation in Historical Perspective, 1 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 53 (1990). 
 56 Marjorie I. Stein, Student Work, Developments in Banking Law: 1993—VI: Resolution Trust 
Corporation, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 57, 57–58 (1994). 
 57 The Federal Home Loan Bank Board—today’s Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)—referred 11,000 
cases to the DOJ in 1987 and 1988.  See KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS IN 
THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 27–28 (1997).  By 1992, there had been 1,000 convictions and a reported 
conviction rate of 91%.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded that, of the 26 largest thrift 
failures, 60% had been marred by “serious criminal activity.”  The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) said 
criminal fraud was a significant contributor to the failure of 33% of its institutions.  Id. 
 58 Stein, supra note 56, at 59.  For additional background on the founding and purpose of the RTC, see 
Lee Davidson, Politics and Policy: The Creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 
17 (2005) (offering a detailed discussion of the RTC’s founding and extensive background on its legislative 
history, as well as information about its structure and oversight); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, The 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Dealing with the Regulators, 107 
BANKING L.J. 196 (1990) (summarizing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989); Wayne M. Josel, Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and the S&L Crisis, 59 
FORDHAM L. REV. 339 (1991) (providing a general discussion of the RTC with focus on its ability to override 
state banking laws). 
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Between 1989 and 1995,59 the RTC took over insolvent thrifts and resolved 
them slowly, funding its operations through a major grant of bailout money by 
Congress and whatever assets it could take advantage of in the failed thrifts 
themselves.  The scale of the RTC’s actions was breathtaking.  From 1986 to 
1995, 1,043 thrifts failed, to the tune of over $500 billion.60  Taxpayers paid 
$124 billion to insured depositors; the thrift industry put in another $29 billion 
or so.61 
To resolve the failed thrifts, the RTC used three methods: (1) liquidating 
assets and reimbursing depositors; (2) merging, consolidating, or reorganizing 
the insolvent thrift into an existing thrift; and (3) dismantling the thrift by 
selling deposits to other S&Ls or banks.62  The problem faced by the RTC—
and all would-be resolvers—was that it was instructed to balance speed and the 
maximization of value, on the one hand, and to resolve the S&L crisis quickly, 
on the other.  Such rapid resolution was often at odds with the maximization of 
the value of the failed thrifts, which counseled for a degree of forbearance and 
for a holding of the thrifts’ assets until the crisis blew over.  Its ability to 
balance the threat of getting fire-sale prices for the S&L assets against the risk 
that a failed institution would never sell made the RTC a generally praised 
financial regulator—but it engaged in mop-up effectiveness, rather than crisis-
prevention effectiveness.63 
Moreover, the dealings of the RTC and federal regulators with financial 
groups during the S&L crisis included resolutions that led to constitutional 
litigation, though ultimately upheld by the courts.64  These resolutions 
foreshadowed the problems with financial conglomerates that have made 
reform of the resolution system such a high priority. 
In the wake of the S&L crisis, Congress passed a statute designed to ensure 
that regulators, and especially the FDIC, would not again exercise regulatory 
forbearance while insolvent institutions pursued risky lending strategies.  
Congress designed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
 
 59 Lisa L. Bonner, Student Work, Developments in Banking Law: 1995—VII: Updating FDICIA/RTC, 15 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 81, 81 (1996) (“The RTC went out of business on December 31, 1995.”). 
 60 Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 
FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 26 (2000). 
 61 Id. at 33. 
 62 Stein, supra note 56, at 67–68. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and Thrifts, 
27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 385–89 (1990) (describing the takeovers of First Republic and MCorp). 
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Act (FDICIA) to “capitalize and protect the bank insurance funds, reform the 
deposit insurance system, and improve supervision of federally insured 
depository institutions, including foreign banks.”65  The centerpiece of 
improved supervision was to be PCA—to force government action before 
resolution.66  However, this new authority reached only banks, thrifts, and to 
some degree, their holding companies, which could be relied on as “sources of 
strength” for the tottering bank or thrift.67 
The action-forcing aspects of the FDICIA require the FDIC to regularly 
review each institution governed by its deposit insurance and assess the 
adequacy of the institution’s capitalization on a scale ranging from well 
capitalized to critically undercapitalized.68  The Act also requires regulators to 
follow a variety of specified procedures whenever institutions fall below the 
well-capitalized threshold: for instance, placing limitations on the sorts of 
deposits they can accept, requiring the development of a capital restoration 
plan, insisting that the institution raise more capital, requiring divestitures, and 
changing the board.  Institutions that remain critically undercapitalized for 
ninety days must be placed into receivership or conservatorship.69  In this 
sense, PCA is meant to prepare both the board of the bank and the regulator for 
resolution.  Other requirements imposed on the agency were designed to force 
the FDIC to resolve economically.  Although difficult to enforce, §1823 of the 
FDICIA requires the FDIC to use the least costly methods possible in resolving 
failing financial institutions and prohibited the agency from overinsuring 
depositors.70 
 
 65 Stephen K. Huber, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 109 
BANKING L.J. 300, 300 (1992). 
 66 The FDICIA gave the FDIC new PCA powers that were as much designed to require the FDIC to act 
as to expand the role of the agency.  See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Evaluating FDICIA, in 9 FDICIA: BANK 
REFORM FIVE YEARS LATER AND FIVE YEARS AHEAD 23 (George Kaufman ed., 1997) (“Among the most 
important features of FDICIA is its prompt corrective action provisions, which require the FDIC to intervene 
earlier and more vigorously when a bank gets into trouble.”). 
 67 This is a well-known provision of the federal Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850 
(2006).  See Policy Statement on the Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength 
to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (Apr. 30, 1987).  FDICIA’s adoption, however, did not mean 
that all holding companies would always be dunned.  See generally Wachtel v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (ruling that the government must prove reckless disregard of legal obligations or unjust enrichment to 
require a holding company to pay for losses incurred by a savings bank subsidiary).  The resolution authority 
granted by the FDICIA did not reach shadow banks and non-banks—even systemically significant ones like 
investment banks and insurance companies.  And if the holding company itself is insolvent, it obviously 
cannot serve as a source of strength and cannot be resolved under the FDIC’s ordinary statutory powers. 
 68 See Huber, supra note 65. 
 69 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006). 
 70 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2006). 
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When it exercises its authority under the Act, the FDIC takes over a failing 
bank as either a conservator or a receiver.71  A receiver simply winds up the 
bank.  It acts no differently than would a bankruptcy court liquidating the 
assets of a failed firm, though it does so with some expertise about the 
implications of failure for both individual banks and the financial system as a 
whole.  The difference from bankruptcy, from the FDIC’s perspective, is that 
once the failed company is liquidated, it may use its insurance funds to pay the 
deposit-insurance-covered creditors of the failed institution. 
A conservator, on the other hand, either continues to manage the bank until 
the bank is sold to a solvent institution, or creates a federally chartered bridge 
financial company to hold some or all of its assets until such time as net asset 
value is maximized.72  The bridge financial company is a technical innovation, 
but one that the agency views as critical to the success of its resolution 
program.73  Its purpose is straightforward: it is a vehicle designed to buy the 
FDIC time before it is forced to dispose of an insolvent institution’s assets at a 
particularly low price.74 
Conservators that wind up the debts of the seized bank need not heed ipso 
facto clauses in contracts (which are accelerated if the institution ever goes 
bankrupt), can make the government a supercreditor, can disaffirm 
“burdensome contracts” (but must pay compensation), and may generally 
provide what might be called unequal treatment.  That is, the conservator can 
treat different creditors differently if that is deemed best for the failing 
company.75  The FDIC can also provide financial assistance to these 
 
 71 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006). 
 72 The new rules limit the receivership to three years, with the possibility of obtaining two more upon a 
showing of necessity, as defined by the statute.  See Stuart Stock et al., Dodd-Frank Act: Systemic Risk 
Regulation and Orderly Liquidation of Systemically Important Firms, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 6 (July 21, 
2009), http://www.cov.com/ (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Covington E-Alert & Advisory” 
hyperlink; then follow “Dodd-Frank Act: Systemic Risk Regulation and Orderly Liquidation of Systemically 
Important Firms” hyperlink). 
 73 Bridge financial companies are an interesting legal development in their own right—the federal 
government charters few corporations outside of the financial sector, and even then, it does not handle some of 
the basics of the corporate form.  Bridge companies are created without many formalities.  Christopher 
Stoakes, Marrying Venture Capital and High Yield, EUROMONEY, July 1998, at 28. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006); Seth Grosshandler, Securities, Forward and Commodity Contracts 
and Repurchase, Swap and Master Netting Agreements Under U.S. Insolvency Laws, in ADVANCED SWAPS 
AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 2009, at 181, 241 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 11839) 
(detailing a “Conservator’s . . . Right to Disaffirm or Repudiate Contracts”).  This is not the case for special-
treatment contracts.  Qualified financial contracts include securities contracts, commodities contracts, forward 
contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements, and master agreements for any of the foregoing.  Mark 
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institutions through the conservatorship, a loan, or almost any other 
mechanism.76  In these cases there is little room for judicial review, except for 
some protest by the seized bank and its managers and owners.77  That review is 
handled on a fast track, and it has found little success.78 
To handle its resolutions, the FDIC has created a Division of Resolutions 
and Receiverships; its raison d’être is closing and selling banks and thrifts.79  
Since 1980, approximately half of the over 3,000 occasions on which the FDIC 
has offered some form of assistance to a failing bank or thrift have been 
purchase-and-assumption arrangements, in which an acquiring bank purchases 
the assets of an insolvent bank and assumes its obligations.80  In only about 
250 of these cases has the FDIC simply closed the bank and paid the insured 
depositors the value of their deposits.  Bank failures, in sum, are a matter of 
 
Roe thinks that conferring superpriority on derivatives and swaps “warp[s] the financial industry’s incentives 
to avoid problems.”  Mark Roe, End Bankruptcy Priority for Derivatives, Repos and Swaps, FT.COM (Dec. 15, 
2009, 11:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16da702e-ea41-11de-aeb6-00144feab49a.html. 
 76 See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (2006). 
 77 See id. § 1821(j). 
 78 See id. § 1821(c)(7). 
 79 See Resolutions and Receivership Specialist Intern Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www. 
fdic.gov/about/jobs/drr/drrintern.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010) (“Within FDIC, the Division of Resolutions 
& Receiverships (DRR) is charged with resolving failing and failed financial institutions, which includes, 
among other important responsibilities, ensuring depositors’ have prompt access to their insured funds.”). 
 80 The following chart summarizes the types of assistance offered by the FDIC: 
 
Transaction Type Description of Transaction Type Frequency of Use 
A/A  Assistance Transactions. 588 
REP Reprivatization; management takeover with or without assistance at takeover, 
followed by a sale with or without additional assistance. 
3 
P&A Some or all of the deposits, certain other liabilities, and a portion of the assets 
(sometimes all of the assets) were sold to an acquirer.  It was not determined if all of 
the deposits were assumed (PA) or only the insured deposits were assumed (PI). 
178 
PA Purchase and Assumption, where the insured and uninsured deposits, certain other 
liabilities, and a portion of the assets were sold to an acquirer. 
1673 
PI Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits only, where the traditional P&A 
was modified so that only the insured deposits were assumed by the acquiring 
institution. 
143 
IDT Insured Deposit Transfer, where the acquiring institution served as a paying agent for 
the insurer, established accounts on their books for depositors, and often acquired 
some assets as well.  Includes asset-backed transfer, a Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) transaction that is very similar to an IDT. 
403 
MGR An institution where FSLIC took over management and generally provided financial 
assistance.  FSLIC closed down before the institution was sold. 
37 
PO Payout, where the insurer paid the depositors directly and placed the assets in a 
liquidating receivership. 
264 
Total:  3289 
  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Failures and Assistance Transactions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2010&EndYear=1980&State=1 (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2010); HSOB Help, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/Help.asp?EntryTyp=60 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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mergers and acquisitions substantially more than they are simply a matter of 
insurance claims adjustment.81 
2. Resolution Authority and the Financial Crisis 
The government has always followed a boom and bust, rather procyclical 
approach to bank failures, despite the best efforts of Congress to encourage the 
contrary.  Its response to the recent financial crisis has been no exception.  
That is, it has tended to fail institutions when times are bad, such as during the 
S&L crisis of the 1980s and during the recent financial crisis, but not when 
they are good.  As Table 1 illustrates, the FDIC’s resolution authority bureau 
all but closed up shop between 1995 and 2005, in two of those years failing no 
institutions at all, and over that decade failing fewer than it did in the year 
1993 alone.  The slow times have changed since 2007.  Although most often 
evoked to deal with small banks—which were failing at a rate of about one to 
nine per week during the height of the recent financial crisis82—the current 
FDIC authority has worked when applied to large institutions like Washington 
Mutual, which would have been the largest financial institution failure ever, 
were it not for the collapses of AIG and Lehman Brothers.83 
  
 
 81 The recent financial crisis has tested the FDIC’s capacity for damage control.  In one case, the FDIC 
was forced to create a thirty-day bridge bank when it could not find a buyer.  Jake Bernstein, The 30-Day 
Bank, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2009, 4:04 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-30-day-bank-414.  In 
another case, it simply mailed checks to depositors in the amount of their insured funds.  Paul Kiel, Bank 
Failure Friday: 7 Banks Go Down, 3 with No Buyer, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2009, 2:12 PM), http://www. 
propublica.org/ion/bailout/item/bank-failure-friday-7-banks-go-down-3-with-no-buyer-1219. 
 82 See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist. 
html (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
 83 Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy After Suitors Balk (Update 
1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
a6cDDYU5QYyw; Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. 
Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1. 
ZARING GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  11:42 AM 
118 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 









2010 118 118 0 
2009 148 140 8 
2008 30 25 5 
2007 3 3 0 
2006 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 
2004 4 4 0 
2003 3 3 0 
2002 11 11 0 
2001 4 4 0 
2000 7 7 0 
1999 8 8 0 
1998 3 3 0 
1997 1 1 0 
1996 6 6 0 
1995 8 8 0 
1994 15 15 0 
1993 50 50 0 
1992 181 179 2 
1991 271 268 3 
1990 382 381 1 
1989 534 531 3 
1988 470 232 238 
1987 262 217 45 
1986 204 162 42 
1985 180 139 41 
1984 106 83 23 
1983 99 50 49 
1982 119 34 85 
1981 40 9 31 
1980 22 10 12 
As Table 1 indicates, and as Figure 1, which covers a roughly 
contemporaneous period, also suggests, the FDIC fails institutions almost 
 
 84 HSOB Bank & Thrift Failures—Summary Report, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/ 
hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2010&EndYear=1980&State=1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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exclusively when times are bad for the banking system.  The S&L crisis of the 
1980s and the recent crisis account for most of these failures. 
Figure 1: Bank Failures 1970 to November 30, 2009 (in 2005 Dollars)85 
Neither the FDICIA nor PCA has mitigated this procyclical story.  Indeed, 
during 2009, in the depths of the crisis, the agency never subjected most of the 
institutions that it failed to PCA orders.  In fact, only 27 out of 140, or about 
19%, of the failed banks received them.  Twenty-one of these institutions were 
closed without any prior notice by the agency.  As Figure 2 demonstrates, 
while the FDIC took an average of 66.37 days to notify those institutions that 
they were in trouble through the PCA discipline, the number of days between a 
PCA order and closure declined over the course of the year. 
 
 85 Figure 1 comes courtesy of the Congressional Oversight Panel.  See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF FUND ACHIEVED 
45 (2009). 
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Figure 2: The Decline in PCA Notice During the 2009 Crisis86 
Date of PCA Order 
The import of this record is clear enough: the FDIC did not use its PCA 
authority frequently and, as the crisis deepened, increasingly elected to shrink 
the time between PCA notice and seizure. 
This record, which reveals that the government resolves less than Congress 
hoped it would and, perhaps, too much during crises, poses some questions.  
Does expanded resolution authority do any good?87  When the government did 
clearly have resolution authority—most notably in its supervision of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac—the process was unable to forestall cataclysm.88  For 
other resolvable banks, the FDIC has tended to act harshly when banks are at 
their most vulnerable—an unsurprising fact, but one totally at odds with what 
Congress and commentators have urged the agency to do. 
 
 86 The source of the data used to generate Figure 2 comes from ProPublica’s failed bank database.  See 
Failed Bank List, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/tables/failed-banks/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
 87 This question was considered in a short editorial by the author.  See David Zaring, Why Congress 
Should Not Fix ‘Too Big to Fail,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2009, 6:06 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ 
hearing/2009/04/should_congress_fix_too_big_to.html. 
 88 See Louise Story, New Aid for Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at B4 (summarizing 
briefly the post-crisis experience of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Chris Isidore, Fannie & Freddie: The Most 
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B. The Dodd-Frank Approach 
One way to deal with the problem of resolving financial conglomerates is 
to broaden the reach of such authority, while simultaneously making a seizure 
harder to authorize—for instance, by requiring a number of different officials 
to sign off before it could be exercised.  A broader authority would allow the 
government to take over the types of conglomerates it failed to resolve during 
the recent financial crisis, while the requirements of consultation would check 
against the rash use of that authority.  These sorts of changes appeared in the 
Executive Branch’s proposals for financial reform shortly after the crisis 
began, and they made their way into the final legislation.89  To check overhasty 
decisions to resolve, the Dodd-Frank Act adds a sign-off from a court in 
addition to internal Executive Branch consultation.90  Such proposals do not 
reduce the risk of government overreach or underreach enough, as it is unlikely 
that various political appointees in the same branch of government, appointed 
by the same party and president, will disagree about whether to bail out 
institutions.  Nor does the addition of a late, fast-paced sign-off by the district 
court in D.C. resolve this problem.91  Neither approach precludes rash 
decisionmaking or insulates the decision to resolve from the political and 
lobbying pressures that apparently have made it so difficult to exercise. 
Nonetheless, the statute has many useful resolution authority features.  
Importantly, it requires the government to make a list of the companies that 
will be subject to resolution authority.92  As the list is only limited to the rather 
broadly defined category of “financial companies,” the government reserves 
the power to address new sorts of systemically important players in the 
financial world.93  Thus, such a list provides flexibility while preserving a form 
 
 89 See supra Part I.A. 
 90 At the same time, the Dodd-Frank Act does not require judicial review if the resolved firm’s board 
consents to the appointment of the FDIC in a resolution process.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a)(1)(A)(i); see 
also Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July 
21, 2010, DAVIS POLK (July 21, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-
b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-
f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf (“Because the statute protects directors against any 
liability for acquiescing or consenting to the FDIC’s appointment in ‘good faith,’ it is likely that the Treasury 
Secretary will put intense pressure on boards to acquiesce or consent in order to avoid judicial review of the 
appointment decision.”). 
 91 Dodd-Frank Act § 202 (providing for this sort of judicial review). 
 92 Id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (creating a category of “Nonbank financial compan[ies] supervised by the board of 
governors”); § 113 (authorizing the designation of a list of such companies). 
 93 Dodd-Frank’s resolution powers are couched in terms of financial companies; these companies are 
defined somewhat complicatedly as having activities that are “financial in nature.”  For more details, see id. 
§ 163(b). 
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of notice and contestation for those companies that the government brands as 
systemically significant and, therefore, subject to resolution.94  A review of the 
Dodd-Frank approach to fixing resolution authority both offers insights into 
different ways to conceptualize the power and provides a basis for the 
evaluation of the proposal herein.  Thus, this Article reviews this approach—
both as it was first articulated by the Executive Branch in its request for new 
resolution authority from Congress and in its final form in the Dodd-Frank Act.  
This Article also discusses the so-called “living wills” requirement of banks, 
which has also found its way into the statute. 
1. Broader Authority, More Sign-Offs 
The Obama Administration proposed, and Congress passed, legislation 
broadening federal resolution powers to “financial companies,” including non-
banks “predominantly engaged in financial activities,” holding companies of 
insurers, broker-dealers, and financial holding companies as defined by the 
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).95  Some of these companies are 
automatically subject to the new resolution authority—for instance, bank 
holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets—while other financial 
companies would be designated by a two-thirds vote of the members of the 
newly created Financial Oversight Council, comprised of the heads of the 
federal financial regulators.96  Congress has also permitted the government to 
raise an “orderly liquidation fund” from large banks to cover the shortfalls 
possible in the event of a large insolvency.97 
The new approach could—controversially—include hedge funds and 
private equity shops if their equity interests qualify them as holding 
 
 94 Id. §§ 202–203 (describing the listing and review process). 
 95 Id. §§ 102(a), 113 (setting forth the considerations for making a determination that non-bank financial 
companies should be overseen by the Federal Reserve, which in turn makes them eligible for resolution).  For 
some of the initial efforts to create a category of systemically significant institutions, see Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Proposes Legislation for Resolution Authority (Mar. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg70.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury].  Congress 
concluded that financial companies would be defined by a number of factors, including leverage, 
interconnectedness, size, and the like.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2) (defining, inter alia, the categories of 
institution that may be subject to resolution authority); see also Shasha Dai, Still Unclear What Tier-1 FHC Is, 
but at Least We Know What It Isn’t, WALL ST. J. PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT BLOG (July 23, 2009, 6:53 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2009/07/23/still-unclear-what-tier-1-fhc-is-but-at-least-we-know-what-it-
isnt/tab/article/; U.S. Regulatory Reform Would Impose Strict Limits on Investments and Activities of 
Systemically Significant Financial Firms, CLIFFORD CHANCE, (June 18, 2009), http://www.cliffordchance. 
com/publicationviews/publications/2009/06/u_s_regulatory_reformwouldimposestrictlimit.html. 
 96 Dodd-Frank Act § 113 (providing for a designation of “systemically significant” institutions). 
 97 Id. § 210(n). 
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companies, though the Dodd-Frank Act provides a number of safe harbors for 
various kinds of sophisticated or foreign investors.98  By moving away from 
banks and thrifts toward a more inclusive view that encompasses companies 
that own banks and bank-like institutions that serve a crucial financial role, the 
proposal will, it is hoped, solve the problems created by the lack of coverage of 
financial conglomerates like Lehman and AIG. 
Because commercial banks and thrifts are already subject to the FDIC 
resolution authority, which works differently and usually faster than the 
Bankruptcy Code, the FDIC has figured prominently into the Act as the 
administrator of the new resolution.99  Congress’s new grant of resolution 
authority largely extends the FDIC’s resolution procedures to bank holding 
companies and other designated financial companies.100  The Administration 
has the power, following the FDICIA rating system described earlier, to 
require more action when financial companies appear to be undercapitalized.101  
The combination of some limitations on leverage, more prudential oversight of 
a broader category of financial companies, and stronger resolution authority 
that can be used on such companies, would, in theory, prevent chaotic failures 
 
 98 Id. § 413 (adjusting the “accredited investor” standard, the standard that exempts wealthy investors 
from various sorts of SEC regulation); § 170 (permitting the Federal Reserve to pass regulations exempting 
certain foreign banks from the reach of the statute).  For a discussion, see “Too Big to Fail” Policy (Warning: 
Long), ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPT (Oct. 20, 2009, 3:05 AM), http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2009/ 
10/too-big-to-fail-policy-warning-long.html.  It would not apply to subsidiaries of holding companies that are 
registered broker-dealers covered by their insurance scheme and insurance companies.  FDIC and Capital 
Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/role. 
html (last updated July 21, 2010). 
 99 See supra Part I.A.  Indeed, commercial banks and thrifts are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code by 
definition.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109 (2006) (defining who is a person and who may be a debtor, 
respectively). 
 100 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 204, 210. 
 101 Id. §§ 165, 171.  Section 171 refers to the PCA requirements when devising “leverage requirements.”  
Although the Federal Reserve will devise many of the relevant details through regulation, those requirements, 
if they track the FDIC’s, would particularly affect systemically significant institutions deemed 
“undercapitalized,” which would largely involve more scrutiny by regulators.  “Significantly undercapitalized” 
institutions would receive further scrutiny; they might be sold, management might be replaced, and the 
compensation of senior executive officers might change.  “Critically undercapitalized” institutions would be 
forced to file for bankruptcy within ninety days.  These terms were devised by Congress, see 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1831o(b) (2006), and have been implemented by regulation by the FDIC, see 12 C.F.R. § 303.200 (2008).  
The idea is that the tiers of undercapitalization, which require regulators to initiate PCA, will set up the bank 
for a non-chaotic failure. 
ZARING GALLEYSFINAL 10/5/2010  11:42 AM 
124 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
like that of Lehman Brothers by forcing regulators into action via an ordered 
evaluative process.102 
Resolution powers can only be deployed after an elaborate consultation 
process that would eventually reach the President himself.  First, the Secretary 
of the Treasury would have to make a “systemic risk determination” that (1) a 
financial company is in default or in danger of default, (2) the failure of the 
financial company and its resolution under the Bankruptcy Code or other 
applicable law would have serious adverse effects on financial stability or 
national economic conditions, and (3) any actions or assistance under the 
proposed legislation would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.103  Second, 
this final determination can only be made upon recommendation by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve Board”) 
and the FDIC or the other primary regulator of the systemically significant 
financial institution.104  Third, the Secretary must consult with no less than the 
President himself before acting.105  And finally, the systemic risk 
determination is also subject to a quick review by the D.C. district court.106 
Upon making the necessary determination, the Treasury Department could 
then deploy its powers of conservatorship or receivership, or employ some of 
the tools used so often during the bailout: injections, asset purchases, loans, 
debt assumption, and a variety of other approaches that essentially untie the 
hands of the government agency.  These actions would be funded by a special 
assessment from the Treasury’s general funds and by special assessments on 
 
 102 As this Article emphasizes elsewhere, however, it is difficult to persuade regulators to use their early 
warning system, and the recent financial crisis has been no exception.  In this connection, consider the 
following account: 
At bank after bank, the examiners are discovering that state and federal regulators knew lenders 
were engaging in hazardous business practices but failed to act until it was too late. . . .  In many 
instances, the financial overseers failed to act quickly and forcefully to rein in runaway banks, 
according to reports compiled by the inspectors general of the four major federal banking 
regulators. 
Eric Dash, Post-Mortems Reveal Obvious Risk at Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at B1. 
 103 Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 95, at 2. 
 104 Dodd-Frank Act § 203.  The recommendation would advise whether the FDIC should appoint itself as 
conservator or receiver of the financial company, whether and to what extent to provide the company with 
assistance, and whether to take any other action.  Id.  The recommendation would also require the consent of 
no less than two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board and two-thirds of the board or commission of the 
appropriate federal regulatory agency.  Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Indeed, the review must be concluded within twenty-four hours.  Id. § 202. 
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the relevant industry sector.107  The Treasury Department may assign the 
FDIC, with its considerable experience, to assist in the winding-down 
process.108 
All of these processes are limited by certain instructions from Congress, 
designed—somewhat hopefully given the government’s track record—to 
ensure that creditors and shareholders will bear the company’s losses, that 
management will be replaced, and that, ideally, tax revenues will not be used 
to bail out the firm.109  The government faces other restrictions as well; it 
cannot take an equity interest in firms that it is inclined to resolve, for 
example.110 
But the fundamental strategy for resolution in the Dodd-Frank Act is clear 
enough.  It broadens most of the FDIC’s resolution powers to apply to a new 
category of financial companies, most of which will be large bank holding 
companies or financial companies designated as “systemically significant.” 
2. How Broad Is Broad? 
Identifying precisely where systemic risk begins is a particularly difficult 
task for any proposal for financial reform.  The Treasury Department has 
suggested that resolution authority must be better able to reach the bank and 
thrift holding companies, and that large financial services conglomerates like 
AIG must face at least the theoretical prospect of seizure.111  However, 
Congress has tried to keep that power canalized within the banks of relatively 
formal concepts like “holding” and “financial” companies; while the latter 
category is new, the Federal Reserve has long had some authority for defining 
what is “financial in nature.”112  In this sense, the new authority will not only 
 
 107 Id. § 203. 
 108 There is, however, some evidence that the FDIC’s resolution authority is not working perfectly.  
During the recent financial crisis, some banks failed under supervision of an FDIC program designed to 
streamline the process and be less intrusive for regulated institutions.  James Sterngold, FDIC’s 20% Shorter 
‘Merit’ Reviews Preceded Failures (Update1), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a3auv.3nhk.A&pos=10.  Such a program is unlikely to have a 
perfect record, of course, but the point is that imperfection inheres in the regulatory plan. 
 109 Dodd-Frank Act § 214. 
 110 Id. § 206. 
 111 See Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 95. 
 112 The “canalized within banks” language is that of Justice Cardozo.  See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).  The “financial in nature” language is 
based on a reference to § 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006), which provides 
a laundry list of the activities in which financial holding companies may engage.  Dodd-Frank Act, 
§ 102(a)(6).  Accordingly, there would be no ability to seize and resolve hedge funds or other players in the 
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create a list of potentially nationalizable institutions, but also a class of them, 
including any institutions that meet the definition of a bank holding company 
with assets over $50 billion. 
Other observers have taken a broader view, one that might be characterized 
as discretionary resolution authority.  As the government has assumed an 
increasingly active role in ensuring systemic economic stability through 
resolution, it may need to consider exercising that authority not just over banks 
and bank-like institutions, but also over other large and interconnected firms, 
such as automakers.  In other words, once important financial institutions are 
potentially resolvable, it is unclear why other interconnected firms—albeit in 
some respects differently interconnected—might not be similarly treated.113 
And while much of the legislation following the financial crisis has been 
justified by claims that the present financial situation is unique and uniquely 
threatens domestic economic stability, much of the government’s action during 
the crisis—bailing out the automakers, most notably—suggests that a broader 
resolution tool would enable the government to avoid the bailout-or-
bankruptcy dilemma in other contexts.114  Moreover, in the past, many of the 
government’s most expensive bailouts have gone not to financial institutions, 
but to other businesses—again, most notably the automakers, but also large 
defense manufacturers and the like.115 
The problem with these sorts of proposals is that pure discretion to resolve 
if necessary gives the government little guidance and fails to limit those 
institutions that might be covered by the nationalization power.  This broad 
 
shadow financial system that are too big or interconnected to fail, unless they own federally insured thrifts or 
banks and meet a certain size level. 
 113 They may be dissimilar for Takings Clause purposes.  As Christopher T. Curtis has pointed out, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has suggested that a physical occupation of private property constitutes a per se taking to 
which the ad hoc, multifactor approach used in most cases of so-called regulatory takings does not apply.  But 
that proposition cannot apply to regulatory takeovers of banks and thrift institutions, because they are not 
physical property.”  Curtis, supra note 64, at 375.  Automakers and other businesses that consist of plants, 
parts, machinery, etc., may be subject to more careful Takings Clause scrutiny should the government care to 
step in. 
 114 For a discussion of the auto bailouts, see University of Rochester Roundtable on Bankruptcy and 
Bailouts: The Case of the US Auto Industry, J. APPLIED FIN., Fall/Winter 2008, at 97 (2009); see also Randy 
Picker, Can You Put Cars Under the Tarp?, U. CHI. FACULTY BLOG (Dec. 12, 2008, 10:06:52 AM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2008/12/can-you-put-cars-under-the-tarp.html; David Zaring, Can the 
TARP Be Pulled over Detroit?, THE CONGLOMERATE (Dec. 14, 2008), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/ 
12/can-the-tarp-be.html [hereinafter Zaring, THE CONGLOMERATE]. 
 115 See, e.g., Tara Branum & Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and Bailouts: Aviation and the Return 
of Big Government, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 431 (2002); Longman, supra note 32, at 14–18. 
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delegation of power might even implicate separation of powers problems like 
those posed by the rarely invoked, but often in the background, nondelegation 
doctrine.116  As such a proposal would broaden the power to destroy to a truly 
wide ambit, the constraints imposed by the government are first definitional—a 
class of institutions are to be affected, and no more—and second, internally 
procedural—sign-offs must be obtained before power is exercised. 
But by implementing procedural hurdles to constrain exercise of resolution 
authority, this authority relies on internal deliberations—to which outsiders are 
rarely privy—among political appointees who often have every reason to 
follow the will of the administration’s leadership.  Further, the very short, and 
circumventable, window of review by the D.C. district court is unlikely to 
change the essential nature of this inquiry.  In other words, the procedural 
limitations likely will not be particularly constraining. 
3. Living Wills 
In addition, Congress has embraced the possibility of requiring banks to 
come up with so-called living wills or, as termed by Dodd-Frank, “resolution 
plans.”117  This provision requires systemically significant financial companies 
and bank holding companies to “report. . .the plan. . .for rapid and orderly 
resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure,” including how 
such a failure would affect any parts of the financial conglomerate that enjoy 
 
 116 For the canonical statements of the extent of the nondelegation doctrine and the only two cases in the 
history of the Supreme Court to use it to strike down legislation, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 117 See The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry 
Comm., 111th Cong. 1−2, 40 (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) (“Large interconnected firms should also be required to develop their own liquidation plan⎯a 
living will so to speak⎯which would demonstrate that they could be broken apart and sold in an orderly 
manner.”); Roshni Banker, Note, Glass-Steagall Through the Back Door: Creating a Divide in Banking 
Functions Through the Use of Corporate Living Wills, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 424 (arguing that living 
wills offer a preferable alternative to regulation of the scope of banking activities); Emilios Avgouleas et al., 
Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action 13 (DSF Policy Paper Series, DSF Policy Paper No. 4, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533808 (discussing living wills extensively and arguing that they could make 
resolution of “cross-border financial institution[s]” easier).  In theory, living wills seem to serve the dual 
purposes of clarification and simplification.  First, they enable easy government takeover and disassembly, as 
well as force corporate transparency to facilitate earlier detection of risk.  Second, they reduce what Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) Chairman Adair Turner describes as “complex legal structures designed to maximize 
regulatory and tax arbitrage.”  Chris Giles et al., Living Wills “to Be Forced on UK Banks,” FT.COM (Sept. 14, 
2009, 11:35 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4bb9fd1e-a17b-11de-a88d-00144feabdc0.html (describing 
resistance from banks and suggesting that U.S. banks have assumed a more conciliatory attitude toward the 
living wills issue). 
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deposit insurance.118  It further requires “full descriptions of the ownership 
structure, assets, liability, and contractual obligations of the company.”119  
Regulations by the Federal Reserve and FDIC will set the precise content of 
the wills; companies that fail to develop “credible” living wills are subject to 
sanctions including, potentially, the divestiture of assets and units.120 
Living wills force banks to confront their own mortality and, at their best, 
can create a sort of ex ante timetable and organization chart to smooth the 
ultimate task of resolution in the case of insolvency.121  Congress has required 
large institutions both to make these sorts of wills and to update them 
periodically.122  By requiring banks to identify their various subsidiaries to 
regulators and to suggest a process that might be used to wind up those 
subsidiaries, living wills could transform the real complexity that financial 
institutions have utilized in the past to engage in tax arbitrage and regulatory 
avoidance.123 
All of this is usefully cautious, but it is also imperfect.  Living wills may 
make banks more risk averse—or they may not.  Planning for one’s death 
looks like it would have psychological ramifications, but, of course, financial 
intermediaries are not people.124  The Treasury Department would actually 
impose a profitability hit on those covered by the living will requirement by 
 
 118 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Perhaps for this reason, British regulators and academics appear to be particularly enamored of them.  
See, e.g., Alistair Darling, A Strong City Is Not Just in Britain’s Interests, TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2009, at 20 
(“Living wills are now the agreed tool for ensuring that banks, not taxpayers, meet the cost of any future 
failures.”); Avgouleas et al., supra note 117, at 8–9; Giles et al., supra note 117. 
 122 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1). 
 123 However, as Gillian Tett points out: 
The issue at stake revolves around a matter that often bedevils personal wills—namely, the tricky 
question of transparency.  In order to make it easy to wind down a large bank, it is crucial to have 
structures that are relatively simple and streamlined.  However, in the past few decades, the 
largest banks in the world have stealthily built corporate structures that are fiendishly complex, 
straddling numerous borders and plagued with offshore entities.  Lehman Brothers was but one 
example of that.  The pattern, of course, is no accident.  After all, large investment banks excel in 
regulatory and tax arbitrage, and all that cross-border complexity and opacity enables them to 
exploit such loopholes with ease.  The pattern is also one reason that the living will idea could be 
very controversial, if regulators ever try to push it through. 
Gillian Tett, Idea of “Living Wills” Is Likely to Die a Quiet Death, FT.COM (Aug. 13, 2009, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/098ac1ec-882d-11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html. 
 124 This is one reason why the living will idea seems attractive in theory but would raise many problems 
in practice.  What if the bank is wrong?  Or if it makes little real effort to come up with a workable living will, 
an eminently likely possibility? 
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uncovering tax ploys, which will make them, if anything, less safe and sound, 
at least in the near term.125  And just because an institution has outlined all of 
its activities and set forth a way to wind up each one does not mean that 
regulators will have the guts to actually follow the will (and pronounce the 
death sentence that must precede it).  For these reasons, living wills, though 
interesting ideas, should be deemed ancillary aspects of regulatory reform and 
resolution authority itself; the wills make that authority more easily 
exercisable, but do little to identify where and when such authority should be 
exercised. 
None of this is meant as a comprehensive summary of Dodd-Frank’s 
resolution procedures; they are quite detailed, and the focus here is on the heart 
of resolution rather than the ancillary issues that accompany any 
comprehensive financial reform.  The Dodd-Frank Act includes many of these 
accompanying provisions.126  In addition, Congress has also enacted high-
minded nostrums like “taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of” 
resolution authority.127  But it is these sorts of fundamental values that 
expanded resolution authority risks traducing, as the next Part makes clear. 
II. ANTI-SEIZURE PROTECTIONS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Resolution authority’s legitimacy turns on a bargain that its expansion will 
largely undo.  The bargain offered by the FDIC is unprecedented powers of 
nationalization in exchange for the federally insured bank charter, which offers 
its holders cheap capital and willing depositors.128 
However, the expansion of resolution authority is by its very terms the right 
to seize an institution that does not enjoy, in exchange, the benefit of the bank 
charter and the low cost of capital that comes with it.  Instead, the benefit 
granted by the government is the right to play in the waters of American 
finance at scale, including through the ownership of a bank or thrift subsidiary, 
and to profit accordingly.  While that right is a valuable one, it is very different 
 
 125 See Zaring, THE CONGLOMERATE, supra note 114. 
 126 For example, the Act provides the government with the power to claw back compensation from 
executives during a two-year period before resolution, as well as the ability to levy a fee on large financial 
institutions to cover the costs of supervising them.  Dodd-Frank Act § 318(c). 
 127 Id. § 214(c). 
 128 See Ilan Moscovitz, The Coming Financial Meltdown, MOTLEY FOOL (June 15, 2010), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2010/06/15/the-coming-financial-meltdown.aspx (noting that FDIC 
insurance creates a “cheap source of funding” for banks); cf. Sam Zuckerman, Turning Bankers into 
Entrepreneurs, U.S. BANKER, Jan. 1, 1997, at 46, 46–48. 
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from the corporate form offered to banks and thrifts.  Nor is that right paired 
with formal deposit insurance or the worry-free capital that it attracts,129 hence 
the fact that various of the proposals for resolution authority would permit the 
FDIC to act to take over and shut down institutions that it does not insure or 
regulate. 
But exactly which institutions?  Unless resolution authority’s reach is 
limited to a very carefully defined set of institutions, the scope of those 
affected by the exchange of a government guarantee for the extra-strong 
government imposition will remain unclear, making for uncertain markets and 
potentially skittish shareholders. 
What is needed, and what this Article hopes to provide, is a case for the 
legitimacy of the practice of resolution authority that puts any new expansion 
of that authority onto a firmer base. 
While it is difficult to feel sympathy for the financial institutions facing an 
expanded threat of the government’s death penalty, neither is it always clear 
that this kind of authority will be used for good.130  Although Washington 
Mutual’s shareholders had few options after the FDIC concluded that there was 
a case for seizing and closing the bank and selling its assets to J.P. Morgan 
Chase, some observers think that the agency’s hasty resolution of what was 
then the nation’s largest thrift severely exacerbated the financial crisis.131  If 
 
 129 See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010). 
 130 It is not always obvious that these varieties of resolution authority are wholly threatening to the owners 
of the assets seized by the government, to be sure.  Insolvent institutions, after all, are pretty much by 
definition not likely to be totally valuable.  See, e.g., In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 917 
(Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974) (“[T]here is a certain incongruity between the high demands which the investors 
make of the [Regional Rail Reorganization] Act and the unhappy position they, or in any event most of them, 
occupied when it was enacted.  The idea that billions of dollars of liquidation proceeds of these bankrupt 
railroads are lurking just around the corner is unrealistic in the last degree.”). 
 131 See Felix Salmon, One Question for Sheila Bair, REUTERS BLOG (Nov. 12, 2009, 2:11 PM), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/11/12/one-question-for-sheila-bair/ (“If I could ask her just one 
question, it would be about her actions taking over WaMu and wiping out all its senior unsecured debt.  That’s 
the wholesale interbank market right there, and in the wake of the WaMu collapse, banks pretty much stopped 
lending to each other, fearful that at any point Bair could step in and wipe out billions of dollars in assets.  The 
ensuing credit crunch was responsible for trillions of dollars in stock and bond-market losses, and Tim 
Geithner, for one, was furious at Bair for her precipitous decision.”).  This resolution also probably 
undermined the existence of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (which will be eliminated under Dodd-
Frank), as the agency depended on Washington Mutual for an extremely large proportion of its revenues 
because it was the most likely agency to be folded into another one.  See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, 
Charter Switching and the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Office of Thrift Supervision (Oct. 13, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.uiuc.edu/_shared/pdfs/thrift%20chartering%20draft% 
2010%20dz.docx. 
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resolution authority is to expand, there is good reason to want some limitations 
on its scope. 
This is not merely a policy question; the case for a successful constitutional 
challenge of the expanded authority given the FDIC by Congress is a close 
one.  In what follows, this Article reviews how the Takings Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the constitutional protections against arbitrary and biased 
decisionmaking threaten the resolution authority passed by Congress.  This 
Article further suggests that an imperfectly defined category of institutions in 
peril and a number of Executive Branch sign-offs with one expedited district 
court check might not be able to provide the necessary constitutional basis for 
resolution authority. 
A. Takings 
Before the Dodd-Frank Act, angry shareholders failed to convince the 
courts that the seizure of banks during the recent financial crisis amounted to a 
taking.132  But the case for a takings claim is much closer than it would appear.  
These claims failed in part due to long practice and in part due to the 
potentially vast consequences of permitting them in these sorts of contexts.  
Yet seizing a bank and wiping out shareholders without compensation 
resembles any understanding of a taking.  It therefore must be managed 
carefully if expanded resolution authority is to survive the first attempt to use 
it. 
In fact, under current doctrine, it is not that regulatory seizures could not 
possibly amount to a taking or that resolved financial institutions in particular 
could not play this role.  A regulatory imposition may result in a compensable 
taking in either of two ways: through a physical invasion or through a 
regulatory act that largely destroys a property’s value. 
First, when a regulatory scheme results in a physical invasion or permanent 
occupation of property, such invasions are “compensable without case-specific 
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.”133  In 
general, in the case of physical invasions, the Supreme Court pointed out that 
“no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public 
 
 132 See Thykkuttathil v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 293, 296 (2009) (“A takings claim will not lie for the 
seizure of a bank by federal regulators, even if an allegation is made that the seized bank had not yet failed 
when it was seized.”), aff’d, No. 2010-17109, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17109 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2010). 
 133 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
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purpose behind it, we have required compensation.”134  Of course, a resolution 
involves just this type of a physical invasion: FDIC officials ordinarily show 
up and instruct the employees of the insolvent institution as to what they must 
do over the weekend.135  They also tend to take the books and records of the 
failed institutions.136 
In cases where a regulatory scheme does not involve a physical invasion or 
occupation of property, the Supreme Court “has generally ‘been unable to 
develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require 
that economic injuries caused by public action’” result in a compensable 
taking.137  The Court, however, has identified three factors to consider when 
determining whether a governmental action has exceeded “regulation” to 
become a “taking.”  Those factors are “the character of the governmental 
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations.”138 
Here too the case for a taking is not, on its face, ludicrous: the character of 
the government action is severe, its economic impact, from the perspectives of 
the shareholders, is awesome, and their investment-backed expectations—their 
shares—are, of course, wiped out.  It is also worth noting that, in other 
contexts, the United States has taken the international position that the 
expropriation of private property must be paired with full and fair 
compensation for the owners of that property.139 
To be sure, banks have never had much luck arguing that seizures of their 
assets via the FDIC’s resolution authority implicate the Takings Clause.  The 
Federal Circuit has held that “[g]iven the highly regulated nature of the 
 
 134 Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A] 
permanent physical occupation authorized by [the] government is a taking without regard to the public 
interests that it may serve.”). 
 135 See Mary Gordon, Bank Failure Friday Is Back as Feds Shut Down Four More Banks Last Week, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bank-failure-friday-is-back-as-feds-shut-
down-four-more-banks-last-week-2010-2 (noting that the FDIC tends to fail banks on Fridays). 
 136 Financial Markets in Crisis: Overview of FDIC’s Authority with Respect to Bank Failures, GIBSON 
DUNN (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/FinancialMarketsCrisis-
FDICAuthority-BankFailures.aspx (“The FDIC’s first step as conservator or receiver is to take possession of 
all of the closed institution’s books and records and assets and loans.”). 
 137 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); accord Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 
295 (1981) (applying the “economically viable use” test in determining the existence of a regulatory taking). 
 138 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). 
 139 See generally Curtis, supra note 64 (discussing the compensation required by the Takings Clause 
during government takeovers of banks). 
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banking industry,. . .the [federal regulators’ seizure of the bank] could not 
possibly have interfered with a reasonable investment-backed expectation on 
the part of [the owners of a bank].”140  It has further observed that “[i]t is well 
known that ‘[b]anking is one of the longest regulated and most closely 
supervised of public callings.’”141  Accordingly, “[t]he Federal Circuit has 
never upheld a claim that a seizure of a financial institution under the statutes 
and regulations designed to insure safe and secure banking institutions 
constituted a taking.”142 
Moreover, these recent results are consistent with long established Supreme 
Court precedent.  Decades ago, in Fahey v. Mallone,143 the Court observed 
that: 
Banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised 
of public callings. It is one in which accumulated experience of 
supervisors, acting for many states under various statutes, has 
established well-defined practices for the appointment of 
conservators, receivers and liquidators. . ..A discretion to make 
regulations to guide supervisory action in such matters may be 
constitutionally permissible while it might not be allowable to 
authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.144 
 
 140 Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 141 Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Fahey v. Mallone, 
332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947)); see also Castle v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 187, 220 (2000) (“The law is clear that 
the seizure of a bank that fails to meet regulatory capital requirements does not constitute a taking.”), aff’d in 
relevant part, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1575 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (“Banking is a highly regulated industry, and an individual engaged in that industry is deemed to 
understand if his bank becomes insolvent or is operated in violation of law or regulations, the federal 
government may ‘take possession of its premises and holdings’ and no compensation for that governmental 
action will be due.” (quoting Cal. Hous. Sec., 959 F.2d at 958)); Am. Cont’l Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 
692, 698 (1991) (“[I]t was hardly contrary to reasonable expectations of an investor in the highly regulated, 
federally insured banking industry when the federal government buttressed the then-existing regulatory 
scheme by authorizing appointment of a conservator or receiver when a federally insured bank is in 
[trouble].”).  A bank seizure must be presumed to be lawful when considering a takings claim based on that 
federal action.  See Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1327, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“For takings 
purposes, we therefore must assume the government conduct at issue . . . was not unlawful.”). 
 142 Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 533, 535 (2000), aff’d, 97 F. App’x. 331 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  Similar rules appear to apply in other jurisdictions, which are also unlikely to compensate failed bank 
shareholders.  Northern Rock shareholders lost on their claim that the statutory scheme establishing how much 
the British government has to compensate shareholders violated Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  See SRM Global Master Fund v. Comm’rs of Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2009] 
EWCA (Civ) 788, [2009] W.L.R. [267] (Eng.).  There was much more debate about this question, however, in 
Europe. 
 143 332 U.S. 245 (1947). 
 144 Id. at 250. 
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And the problem is not merely one of doctrine, but of a culture lacking 
sympathy for the owners of federally insured banks.  Foreign shareholders 
frequently have more protection than American shareholders in the case of a 
takeover by banking regulators, for instance as in Europe, which is exceedingly 
worried about the prospect of unwarranted resolution of still-valuable financial 
enterprises.145  But those European financial intermediaries generally do not 
have formal depositor protections in place—the benefit of the bargain for 
which resolution authority is a cost. 
B. Due Process 
The point of resolution authority is both to give the regulators the power to 
act quickly and to encourage them, almost to the point of requiring them, to 
use it.  A problem then arises regarding predeprivation notice and the 
opportunity to a fair hearing, rights usually guaranteed under due process.146  
This then requires a look at the oft-invoked three-factor test in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.147 
 
 145 Nor is this only a matter for the United States.  One private equity fund has sued the German 
government over its seizure of a bank in which the equity fund was heavily invested.  Germany Defends Hypo 
Real Squeeze-Out After Lawsuit, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/idUSLC18214220091012.  The central problem has been described as follows: “Governments forced to 
step in to save the financial system would prefer to close or merge weak banks to revive lending as quickly as 
possible.  But shareholders . . . angling to make lemonade out of lemons, want to eke out the best return they 
can, even if it delays an economic recovery.”  Carter Dougherty, Holding His Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2009, at B4.  J.C. Flowers bought about 25% of Hypo Real Estate in 2008 (approximately $1.8 billion), but 
that has now been reduced to a less than 3% stake.  See JC Flowers Seeks to Block Soffin Forcing Hypo 
Minority Sales, IRISH INDEP. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.independent.ie/business/european/jc-flowers-seeks-
to-block-soffin-forcing-hypo-minority-sales-1911446.html.  The reduction in stake is presumably due to 
dilution.  The uncertainty, of course, can be telling.  It is difficult to plan for the future in a financial institution 
that can go from well-earned to resolved in a matter of days.  Bear Stearns, after all, was deemed solvent by its 
regulator up to the moment of its resolution by contract orchestrated by the Treasury Department.  Davidoff & 
Zaring, supra note 11, at 476 (discussing the SEC’s assessment that Bear Stearns was adequately capitalized 
up until the moment of collapse). 
 146 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 147 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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The Mathews regime clearly applies to financial regulation.148  But this 
does not mean that lengthy predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be 
heard is always required when federal agencies seize failing banks.  In FDIC v. 
Mallen, the Supreme Court identified three factors that typically are present in 
cases in which a postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to satisfy due process: (1) 
the action is necessary to further an important governmental interest; (2) there 
is a need for prompt action; and (3) there is a substantial assurance that the 
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted.149  The Court concluded that the 
FDIC’s seizure powers passed this test, as applied to banks and thrifts.150 
Is due process implicated by a broad new resolution authority regime, 
extending beyond insured banks?  The Mathews test obviously involves strong 
private and strong governmental interests, so it appears that the critical issues 
are the procedures offered by resolution and its alternatives.  It is here that the 
expansion of resolution authority risks denying the seized institution an 
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”151  
As the risks of a wrongful seizure are dramatic, additional procedures, such as 
an auction in addition to the carefully articulated ex ante list, would ensure that 
financial institutions have an adequate opportunity to be heard. 
Moreover, the seizure of a bank will, in many cases, involve the dismissal 
of the board and principals (and Congress has, as it has enhanced resolution 
authority, urged the FDIC to exercise this power), which presents its own due 
process concerns.  The Supreme Court has established that the discharge of an 
employee by a governmental entity interferes with the employee’s liberty 
interest under the procedural Due Process Clause if combined with “any charge 
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his 
community,” although the discharge must be severely stigmatizing to implicate 
constitutional rights.152  But, in an era of intense banker hatred, it is not 
impossible to imagine the seizure of a bank and the firing of its employees 
resulting in this sort of stigmatization.153 
 
 148 FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988). 
 149 Id. at 240–41; see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993, 1001–
02 (5th Cir. 1994) (using the Mallen factors to evaluate the sufficiency of due process in an FDIC takeover). 
 150 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. 
 151 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 152 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
 153 See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE, July 9, 2009, at 52 
(“The world’s most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, 
relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”). 
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Moreover, there are property interests at stake in these kinds of 
terminations.  The Court has held that “the right to continue to serve as 
president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is a 
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. . ..It is 
also undisputed that the FDIC’s order of suspension affected a deprivation of 
this property interest.”154 
Also, while certain limited rights of judicial review are generally available 
in resolution authority statutes, and “the existence of post-termination 
procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of pre-termination 
procedures,”155 the scope of procedures offered to banks and thrifts post-
seizure is limited, and they have rarely resulted in successful claims, making 
the adequacy of the process offered now questionable.156 
One may sense this not only by reviewing the FDIC’s strong won–lost 
record in nationalization claims, but also by looking at how the courts have 
reviewed the claims of those dispossessed by bailouts and their attendant 
processes.  While courts have not said that banking regulator decisions are 
unreviewable as a matter of law, they have avoided in-depth scrutiny of both 
monetary policy decisions and bailouts.  In Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank, 
Augustus Hand refrained from assessing whether a legally constituted bank 
may make loans to other banks and set interest rates for those loans in forming 
a basis for bailouts with Federal Reserve money during the financial crisis of 
1929.157  And as for bailouts, after the Franklin National Bank failed and was 
bailed out by the Federal Reserve, the Second Circuit concluded that: 
Absent clear evidence of grossly arbitrary or capricious action on the 
part of [the Federal Reserve or the Treasury Department,]. . .it is not 
for the courts to say whether or not the actions taken were justified in 
the public interest, particularly where it vitally concerned the 
operation and stability of the nation’s banking system.158 
In sum, because it is very difficult to get judicial review ex post over the 
decision whether to resolve or bail out—as the recent financial crisis, with few 
judicial proceedings, has illustrated—it is not unreasonable to ask whether the 
postdeprivation rules in place are an adequate substitute for more 
 
 154 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 240. 
 155 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 n.12 (1985). 
 156 See David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
 157 34 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 158 Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat’l Bank, 559 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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predeprivation process.  Indeed, the current rules and their amendments leave 
no room for such process at all. 
Worrying about the due process implications of expanded seizure powers is 
hardly crazy.159  The Fifth Circuit has applied the Mathews test to the issuance 
of a capital directive by the FDIC.160  Further, the FDIC itself has conceded 
that it is subject to constitutional review in administering its PCA powers.161  
And although the FDIC’s procedures have generally withstood constitutional 
scrutiny in the past—FDIC v. Mallen upheld a removal procedure that affords 
an indicted bank official a post-termination hearing but neither a full 
evidentiary hearing nor a right to judicial review162—that process occurred in 
the context of the regulated banks and thrifts.  The seizure of real property 
pursuant to drug arrests, for example, has been held by the Court to be 
inconsistent with due process.163  One wonders if the seizure of noninsured 
banking assets would present a similar problem. 
C. Bias 
Lastly, the prospect of the federal banking agencies serving as the 
prosecutor, judge, and executioner of these banks raises at least the specter of 
biased decisionmaking.  Due process also affords some constitutional 
protections in relief of biased decisionmaking,164 and although the combination 
of investigator and decisionmaker in a single agency alone is not enough to 
 
 159 Other lawyers have expressed their concerns about the due process implications of resolution authority 
as it currently exists.  See, e.g., Howard N. Cayne & Michael Caglioti, FDICIA’s New D&O Dismissal 
Authority: What Process is Due?, 14 BANKING POL’Y REP. 1 (1995) (expressing doubt regarding the propriety 
of the method by which the PCA processes the removal rights of the directors of seized banks and its 
compliance with due process related notions of notice and opportunity to be heard). 
 160 FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1130–31 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 161 Id. at 1130 (“[T]he FDIC concedes that unreviewability does not extend to the issue of whether there is 
a ‘constitutional right to a full hearing on the record prior to issuance of a directive,’ and instead asserts that 
the procedures provide due process.”). 
 162 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 248 (1988). 
 163 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993) (employing the 
Mathews test in determining that the seizure of real property without notice and hearing did not, under the 
circumstances of the case, comport with due process). 
 164 Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause 
prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a protected property interest without ‘a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal.’” (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))). 
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offend due process,165 the question, when exemplified by the draconian act of 
resolution authority, is at least worth a bit of thought.166 
Biased decisionmaking usually requires a showing of particular 
prejudgment, rather than the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative 
functions within a single agency in general, which has been permitted ever 
since the Supreme Court decided Withrow v. Larkin.167  But putting the judge 
and the jury together and allowing both to make decisions in a procedure-free 
environment raises the possibility of prejudgment and other problems that, 
surely, regulators would prefer to avoid. 
Bias claims have been leveled before against the FDIC for seizing financial 
institutions; one banking lawyer believes that the entire PCA process, as it 
eschews so many other procedures, is shot through with an unacceptable risk 
of bias and has pursued litigation to that end.168  The possibility of a bias claim, 
let alone a larger notice-before-deprivation claim, makes even more sense 
given the problems associated with the expansion of resolution authority 
beyond the confines of the federally insured bank charter. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL, AND EXERCISABLE, RESOLUTION AUTHORITY 
If an expanded construct of resolution authority could make takings, due 
process, and bias claims viable, the question is how to structure a new regime 
to deal with these problems—as well as the problem of “too big to fail”—while 
incentivizing the government to act when necessary, which it frequently fails 
to do. 
Dealing with the first problem requires both a commonsense solution and a 
creative one.  The commonsense rule is to make clear, ex ante, the financial 
institutions subject to resolution authority.  Publishing a list of these 
institutions, rather than providing guidelines to identify institutions that may be 
subject to nationalization in the future, is better because the ex ante approach 
provides more certainty.  This Part of the Article celebrates the Dodd-Frank 
Act for providing a list and a dispute resolution process, rather than, for 
 
 165 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (rejecting a due process challenge to the combination of the 
roles of investigator and decisionmaker in a state medical examiners’ board). 
 166 See generally Thomas M.L. Metzger, FDIC Capital Directive Procedures: The Unacceptable Risk of 
Bias, 110 BANKING L.J. 237 (1993) (examining procedural due process concerns in the context of FDIC 
decisionmaking). 
 167 421 U.S. at 52. 
 168 For a description of his approach, see Metzger, supra note 166. 
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instance, the alternative originally proposed by the Treasury Department.  The 
Treasury Department’s proposal would have created a class of potentially 
nationalizable institutions, and it would have been difficult to tell precisely 
who belonged to the class and who did not.  The owners of banks should have 
a short window after seizure during which to buy back their institutions from 
the government.  In this way, overreaction by regulators can be countered 
sensibly after a seizure without relying on the so-far toothless mechanism of 
judicial review.  And in this way the problem of regulatory overload can be 
mitigated to address due process—and also plain regulatory capacity—
concerns. 
Incentivizing more action by regulators, however, instead of deterring bad 
decisions, is not easy, although a better form of regulation may lie in 
international relationships instead of domestic ones.  I have often touted, along 
with others, the technocratic potential of international networks of regulators; 
particularly in financial regulation, those networks are extremely well-
developed.169  They offer peer support for and review of the decision to 
resolve, as well as distance from the hurly-burly of domestic lobbying.  This 
Part outlines and justifies a way to handle resolution that might better serve 
both the government and the public. 
A. Protection Against Government Overreach 
No matter how limited the resolution authority, in certain cases, there is 
little hope that the government will be able to act in any way other than 
precipitously.  Emergencies arise, after all, and the recent financial crisis was 
full of momentous decisions rendered overnight, or “before the Asian markets 
open[ed].”170  Moreover, the exact nature of the institution subject to such 
precipitous action could be unclear if resolution authority is delegated poorly.  
Is there some way to use procedure to counteract the possibility of arbitrariness 
in these cases? 
Most likely, there is. As an initial matter, more sensible procedural 
protections for seizable banks would further the important project of 
incentivizing a resolution system to make good decisions.  Moreover, these 
protections would also address the constitutional concerns presented by the 
abandonment of the bargain of resolution authority for deposit insurance, 
 
 169 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36−64 (2004). 
 170 Charles Babington & Alan Fram, Deal Reached on Financial Market Bailout, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 28, 
2008, http://www.nysun.com/national/deal-reached-on-financial-markets-bailout/86725/. 
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which would follow any extension of resolution authority to larger financial, or 
other systemically significant, conglomerates.  The protections would identify 
and give notice to the “regulated industry” for Takings Clause purposes, 
provide the additional procedures necessary to solve Mathews test problems, 
and mitigate the concerns of biased decisionmaking by offering a market check 
on the decisionmaker. 
Specifically, this Article agrees, with some caveats, that the list of non-
FDIC insured institutions that could be subject to resolution authority, as 
provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, is a good idea.  It is important, however, that 
the list be published in advance and revised as the government concludes that 
some institutions belong on the list, or that some have shrunk or otherwise 
limited themselves sufficiently to be removed.  It is also slightly alarming that 
the Act includes a class of financial companies that become subject to 
resolution authority without any listmaking by the regulators⎯namely, those 
firms deemed bank holding companies with $50 billion of assets do not get the 
benefit of an individualized assessment of whether they belong on the list, 
along with the notice and comment and the assorted benefits accompanying 
this sort of ventilation.171 
A list alone, however, is improvable.  This Article suggests that resolution 
authority would be even more legitimate if it provided the institution’s owners 
an opportunity to purchase back the institution shortly after its nationalization.  
This opportunity may not be realistic in every case, but in at least some 
imaginable cases, it may cause the government to pause before committing its 
own funds to clean up an institution rather than offer that institution back to its 
owners.  It also formalizes, after resolution, the informal process the 
government undergoes before resolution, where so-called “problem banks” are 
shopped by the FDIC to potential buyers, without a clear role for the input of 
the institution’s management.  This ad hoc process is not terrible, but would be 
even better if it was clearly part of the resolution process as a requirement 
imposed on the government before nationalization.  Furthermore, the prospect 
of a required auction, though rare in the annals of administrative law, is hardly 
 
 171 The Dodd-Frank Act allows a financial institution to contest the decision to be labeled systemically 
significant before the agency.  The right to judicial review of that decision is somewhat less clear, however.  
Judicial review of decisions to exercise resolution authority are to be made through closed proceedings, 
however, so the publicity permitted by the statute is not entirely clear.  See Dodd-Frank Act § 202. 
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outside the realm of conjecture⎯Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried proposed 
just such an auction process for valuing secured claims in bankruptcy.172 
The following subsections consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
such an approach and conclude that it offers more predictability, certainty, and 
flexibility than would the broader, Executive-Branch-and-financial 
conglomerates-only alternative that Congress passed. 
1. Making a List 
There is much to recommend in providing a list of companies that are 
bigger than banks and thrifts that would be covered by the expanded power of 
resolution authority.  This subsection of the Article presents a theoretical 
justification for Dodd-Frank’s list requirement, along with an expression of 
modest concern over its class of covered entities: bank holding companies with 
over $50 billion in assets.  A revisable list is more flexible and more certain 
than is resolution authority limited to financial companies, if that term were 
defined only by the statute, rather than also by a designation of the Financial 
Oversight Council.173  While a “financial company” is a definition, its 
coverage is not always clear.  For example, consider controlling investors in 
financial intermediaries and holders of single thrift charters, which include 
some very idiosyncratic companies, such as a department store and a maker of 
funeral caskets.  There is little doubt that future mergers will create large 
conglomerates, with some arms having activities “financial in nature,” such as 
providing consumers with credit to purchase the conglomerate’s other 
products.174  If other non-holding (or possibly even financial) institutions 
belong in that list—as suggested by the bailouts of the hedge fund Long-Term 
Capital Management in 1999175 and the auto companies in 2008—they should 
be identified specifically. 
In addition, many observers have suggested that the ability to predict 
whether a particular institution can be resolved is important both because it 
limits the government’s choices to a defined set of institutions, and it allows 
investors to price the possibility of a government takeover.  For example, it is 
 
 172 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386, 2409−23 (2001) (outlining the auction method). 
 173 For a discussion of other proposals regarding resolution authority, such as the proposal to extend the 
power to cover financial holding companies, see supra Part II. 
 174 Donelson & Zaring, supra note 131. 
 175 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (2002) (recounting the fall of Long-Term Capital Management). 
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suggested that if we know who is subject to a government guarantee we will be 
able to order our affairs accordingly and with more certainty.176  It is, to be 
sure, difficult to predict whether the ability to be seized will be seen as an 
advantage by the market (because of an implicit government guarantee for 
some creditors, such as the depositors in banks covered by the FDIC), or a 
disadvantage (because of the threat of seizure).  But one chief advantage of 
resolution authority—that creditors as well as shareholders can suffer losses—
suggests that the certainty of resolvableness may increase the cost of capital for 
the institutions on the list, and many observers worried about the problem of 
too big to fail institutions welcoming higher capital costs for large 
conglomerates not yet covered by FDIC insurance.177 
Finally, another advantage to obligating the government to name the 
institutions that it might nationalize is that it might encourage the government 
to limit the number of institutions that are in fact too big to fail through other 
means.  The exercise of naming the new and big institutions that might be 
subject to expanded resolution powers may help to solve a problem that Art 
Wilmarth has identified as particularly salient and problematic for banks.  He 
has observed that institutions clearly deemed to be too big to fail might also be 
“too big to discipline adequately” because the government is unable to threaten 
the institutions with serious sanctions.178  Since defining the threatened 
institution is a precondition for outlining a credible threat of discipline, 
publishing a list of businesses subject to resolution authority and revising that 
list as necessary, may provide some initial steps toward solving the “too big to 
discipline adequately” problem.  By forcing the government to commit to 
certain institutions that might be on it, such a list can perhaps incentivize the 
government to consider ways to shrink it.179  But creating a category of 
institutions that automatically join this list problematizes this otherwise useful 
approach. 
 
 176 See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS (2004). 
 177 Moreover, the owners and shareholders of institutions that the government identifies as subject to 
potential taking might strive to get off of that list, possibly by shrinking in size and, accordingly, in systemic 
importance. 
 178 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: 
Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 304. 
 179 Id. 
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2. The Market Out 
A list especially helps to solve the Mathews predeprivation process 
problems, and the Dodd-Frank legislation is commendable to the extent that it 
adopts the list requirement.  But the gold standard for constitutional 
administrative procedure is postdeprivation process (such as judicial review), 
and simply making a list does not offer postdeprivation process.  One way to 
address this concern is to offer to the owners and managers of systemically 
significant financial institutions an opportunity to buy their way out of 
resolution conservatorships.  When banks look like they may be insolvent, the 
government frequently, but quietly, cajoles them to consider a sale that can get 
them out of trouble.  But these informal efforts are not required of the 
government; the last clear chance for owners to do something about a financial 
institution that they feel is valuable, but wrongly used by regulators, comes 
after the seizure itself.  However, there is no procedure in place to make use of 
the last clear chance.180  When a seizure occurs, the posturing of the slow-
motion failure is over and a formal resolution process has begun.  At this point, 
the remedies to owners are restricted to judicial review of the terms they 
receive from the FDIC, and in a limited way at that.  This Article has already 
discussed the difficulties faced by owners pursuing post-resolution litigation 
against the FDIC.  Owners would benefit from a final formalized opportunity 
to take back control of the institution from the government: a right of first 
refusal. 
Administrative scholars and Congress rarely urge these sorts of market 
solutions.181  But markets are nowhere deeper than they are for American 
financial intermediaries, the most likely targets of any reformed resolution 
procedure.  In the instance that the regulators erred and seized the institution 
unwisely, then its owners will likely be able to raise the money to buy back the 
institution.182 
In this way, a market out for resolved financial institutions would serve as a 
useful safeguard against the government’s reaching too quickly to nationalize 
viable institutions.  Further, a buy-back window would, if exercised, likely 
 
 180 The last clear chance doctrine in tort is designed to deal with these sorts of games of chicken.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479, 480 (1974). 
 181 For an example where Congress did, in fact, urge such a solution, see Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum 
Equity, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 218–20 (2005) (discussing the FCC’s slow willingness to turn to 
an auction model for its spectrum space after Congress ordered it to conduct auctions). 
 182 Moreover, a guaranteed ex post buy-back opportunity may help both parties avoid posturing about the 
possibility of a seizure before the fact. 
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influence government regulators loath to spend dollars from the fisc to make 
up differences between the obligations of systemically significant institutions 
and those of their many counterparties.183  The buy-back window thus 
concentrates the minds of both the regulators and the regulated after the critical 
decision has been made, but before all of those obligations are unwound.  Use 
of the buy-back will be rare, and is thus no panacea, but there is no better way 
to check an economically significant decision by the government than to see if 
a market-driven alternative exists.  Only a formal ex post auction can do this.  
Nor is the possibility of an auction implausible.  Bebchuk and Fried have 
already recognized the potential power of auctions in valuing secured claims in 
bankruptcy, when, occasionally, secured creditors find that looking to their 
security does not satisfy their claims against the debtor.184  Although the details 
of Bebchuk and Fried’s scheme are complicated, the point for the purposes of 
this Article is that they have devised a plausible approach to auctions initiated 
following government action.  If it can work in the context of bankruptcy, it 
can work in resolution as well. 
Nor should the general prohibition against equity owners retaining a stake 
in a company reorganized following Chapter 11 bankruptcies without 
contributing additional value (the “absolute priority rule” and “new value 
corollary,” respectively) present an insuperable legal problem.185  As a matter 
of law, these bankruptcy rules need not constrain resolutions, which have been 
carved out of the Bankruptcy Code.186  And as a matter of policy, this market-
out offer would turn on the contribution of new value by the owners and 
managers of the resolved institution⎯it is that new value that would form the 
basis of the price paid to the government.  Regulators particularly worried 
about the possibility of self-dealing by the owners during this market check 
could, of course, broaden the formal auction to include outsiders as well as 
insiders.187 
 
 183 Although economists like the idea of valuing government assets by auctioning them on occasion, the 
government looks to these sorts of auctions rarely. 
 184 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 172. 
 185 For a discussion of these rules, see Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 
526 U.S. 434, 444–50 (1999). 
 186 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 187 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 203 North LaSalle suggested that a broader opportunity to participate 
could cure problems with the participation of equity holders in reorganized companies taken through Chapter 
11.  See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458 (“[S]ome form of market valuation may be available to test the 
adequacy of an old equity holder’s proposed contribution.”); see also Hieu T. Hoang, Comment, The New 
Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule After In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership: What Should 
Bankruptcy Courts Do, and How Can Congress Help?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (2000). 
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B. Prevention from Underreach 
New resolution authority does not merely raise concerns about the prospect 
of executive excess.  Executive modesty is an equally serious problem.  Any 
administrative scheme that relies on the exercise of regulatory discretion at the 
right moment expects a lot out of its publicly employed factotums.188  
Regulators, no less than businesspeople, are prone to making mistakes; it 
would be naïve to pretend that, even at its technocratic best, the government 
always gets it right.189  Many scholars, ranging from the Nobel-Prize-winning 
public choice economist James Buchanan,190 to other observers such as 
Clifford Winston, have argued that the government’s economic regulation is 
subject to many systematic pressures that can impinge upon its ability to make 
wise decisions—or any decisions at all.191 
This is the problem of underreach, and this section focuses on that 
possibility.  Having resolution authority, the government still may not exercise 
that authority to the degree that it should.  In fact, past financial crises are 
replete with examples suggesting that regulators consistently forbear in the 
worst cases—relaxing the safety and soundness standards for failing, or 
downright insolvent, institutions in lieu of resolving them.192  Forbearance 
occurred during the S&L crisis of the 1980s.193  There was probably 
forbearance for likely insolvent institutions like Citibank and Bank of America 
during the recent crisis.194  And cynics have noted that Citibank alone arguably 
 
 188 Ron Feldman, Interview with Raghuram Rajan, REGION, Dec. 2009, at 19, 23 (“There is always some 
amount of regulatory capture.  The people the regulators interact with are people they get to know.  They see 
the world from their perspective, and, you know, they want to make sure they’re in their good books.”). 
 189 David Zaring, The Post-Crisis and Its Critics, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter 
Zaring, The Post-Crisis] (discussing some of the often overblown, but hardly baseless fears about government 
intervention in the economy that have shaped many evaluations of the post-crisis). 
 190 Thomas Romer, Nobel Laureate: On James Buchanan’s Contributions to Public Economics, 1988 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 165. 
 191 See CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMIC POLICY 
RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (2006). 
 192 See Charles W. Calomiris et al., Financial Crisis Policies and Resolution Mechanisms: A Taxonomy 
from Cross-Country Experience, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT AND RESOLUTION 25–75 
(Patrick Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005).  For an analysis of the competing concerns behind secrecy in 
bank regulation, see Heidi Schooner, The Secrets of Bank Regulation: A Reply to Professor Cohen, 6 GREEN 
BAG 2D 389, 392 (2003) (“Bank regulators generally insist on sound accounting practices.  However, . . . it is 
not always clear that bank regulators should so insist when disclosure of a loss might threaten the solvency of a 
bank, or worse, the financial system.”). 
 193 See CALAVITA ET AL., supra note 57, at 9–15; Calomiris et al., supra note 192, at 32, 73. 
 194 See Yves Smith, Citi and Bank of America “Encouraged” to Get More Capital as Result of Stress 
Tests, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 27, 2009, 11:19 PM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/04/citi-and-
bank-of-america-e.html. 
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has been insolvent—and enjoyed forbearance—three times in the past forty 
years, once due to sovereign debt exposure, once due to emerging markets 
exposure, and most recently, again, due to housing market exposure.195  As 
Citibank costs the government more and more money, Americans might be 
forgiven for wishing that the bank had been nationalized and sold off or broken 
up much earlier. 
A government that is given the strong tool of resolution authority must be 
encouraged to use it.  But how can it be so encouraged?  The answer offered 
here lies in the internationalization of the exercise of resolution authority.  The 
underlying theory is that a government with broad resolution authority can be 
encouraged to actually utilize its tools by making its decision in an 
international context, subject to a beneficial sort of peer pressure and removed, 
to a degree, from the problems of agency interference.  One international 
institution has already indicated its concern about cross-border resolutions of 
financial intermediaries.196  That institution is the Basel Committee, which is 
an imperfect but available, active, and fully formed resource on which 
governments have relied since 1974 to deal with difficult problems of bank 
supervision.197  The Committee, and other international regulatory networks 
like it, are increasingly essential to any coherent regulation of the ever more 
global financial system.  Because resolution authority is one of the most 
important aspects of any regulatory regime, it makes sense to think about it in a 
global context.  What follows will expand on the advantages of an international 
solution to the problem of resolution authority by considering the international 
nature of the problem, the capacity of the international system, the way such an 
approach would work, and the alternatives to it. 
 
 195 See Citigroup VIEs Raise Question of Solvency, MISH’S GLOBAL ECONOMIC TREND ANALYSIS (Feb. 
26, 2008, 4:52 AM), http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/02/citigroup-vies-raise-question-
of.html.  For a podcast on this issue criticizing Citi’s three bailouts, see Chicago Booth Podcast: The Future of 
Markets, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (June 29, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/ 
podcast/?play=http://chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/audio/2009-05-29-ManConKeynote.mp3#02:07:32 
(featuring six Chicago Booth faculty members including Gary Becker, Kevin Murphy, Anil Kashyup, and 
Steve Kaplan, as well as moderator Ray Suarez, a veteran journalist, reexamining the role of government in the 
economy at a special forum at the 57th annual Management Conference in Chicago). 
 196 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-
BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 15 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE]. 
 197 Zaring, The Post-Crisis, supra note 189. 
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1. International Nature of the Problem 
Cross-border strategies to resolution authority are a necessary part of any 
serious resolution of a big financial firm.  Indeed, such institutions could not 
possibly be more international.  All of the large financial holding companies 
ply their trades in, and spread their risks across, various foreign 
environments.198  The catastrophic failures of Lehman Brothers, and the 
Franklin National Bank and Bank Herstatt before it, are examples of the cross-
border difficulties presented by insolvency.199  A quick and orderly dissolution 
and resolution of a multinational bank in the United States is of little worth if 
the institution collapses in London and Tokyo, and the creditors race to those 
courthouses and pick over the bank’s assets while American regulators attempt 
to figure out exactly what the bank does and does not own.200  Indeed, Lehman 
Brothers was shipping capital to London in vast quantities in its last days in a 
desperate effort to survive the financial crisis.201  Another example is AIG, 
which sold most of its credit default protection—the business that laid it low—
through London.202 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, American regulators have threatened to 
include certain large foreign institutions in their definition of financial 
companies that would be subject to resolution, and in fact, the Dodd-Frank Act 
provides for their regulation.203  But these regulators also have recognized that 
 
 198 See, e.g., id. (suggesting coordinated resolution of financial institutions in light of their increasingly 
global nature). 
 199 See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 200 See BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 196, at 15 (“In the event of the failure of a cross-border financial 
institution, once the relevant component entities enter into insolvency proceedings, the insolvency regimes 
applicable to the major entities are likely to be separate proceedings . . . .”); see also id. at 18 (“The concepts 
of universality and territoriality strictly only describe the way in which national authorities will apply their 
insolvency and related resolution processes to individual institutions (a financial institution with branches and 
assets located in other jurisdictions).  These concepts are not determinative in the situation of financial groups 
consisting of multiple legal entities.  Accordingly whether a jurisdiction follows the universal approach or 
territorial approach in relation to branches does not govern the resolution of subsidiaries of foreign institutions.  
In both cases, the subsidiary is subject to separate, local insolvency proceedings.”). 
 201 Left in Limbo—or Worse—by Lehman, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 1, 2008, 12:08 PM), 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/left-in-limbo-or-worse-by-lehman/ (“The fallout appears to be 
rooted in Lehman’s London unit, where the firm handled billions of dollars in transaction from hedge fund 
clients from all over the world.  Many funds chose to clear trades through London because of regulatory rules 
that allowed firms to borrow more money than they could from brokers in New York.”). 
 202 See Mary Williams Walsh, Risky Trading Wasn’t Just on the Fringe at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2010, at B1; see also Langley et al., supra note 12. 
 203 See infra notes 205–10 and accompanying text. 
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unilateral efforts to take over a big European or Japanese bank with a 
substantial American presence is likely to be exceedingly difficult.204 
The result in the past has often been a race to the courthouse when financial 
intermediaries fail.  The American approach to cross-border insolvencies 
exemplifies the problem, though the courts and Congress have tried to improve 
their global footprint.  The question of how a United States court should act in 
the context of a cross-border insolvency has been the subject of a historical 
debate between two competing theories: territorialism and universalism.205  
Under the territorial approach, American courts and regulators have failed 
institutions without foreign consultation; the universal approach contemplates 
a more coordinated process. 
An example of the difference between territorialism and universalism is 
found in bankruptcy: under its territorial approach, “the court in each 
jurisdiction where the debtor has assets distributes the assets located in that 
jurisdiction pursuant to local rules.”206  This approach “is often referred to 
derogatorily as ‘the grab rule’ because each court takes control of the estate of 
a debtor and tends to distribute them in a way that favors local creditors.”207 
By contrast, the universal approach contemplates “a primary insolvency 
proceeding. . .in the debtor’s domiciliary country” with courts in other 
jurisdictions where the debtor has assets “defer[ring] to the foreign proceeding. 
. .to facilitate the centralized liquidation of the debtor’s estate according to the 
rules of the debtor’s home country.”208  The United States has moved toward 
the universal approach, but the problem becomes finding the right country in 
which to centralize resolution or liquidation.  In bankruptcy, the American 
approach contemplates a number of factors in deciding whether an American 
court should coordinate its efforts to deal with a bankrupt firm that has a 
presence in other countries—and that has filed for bankruptcy in those 
 
 204 See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text. 
 205 See, e.g., Nigel John Howcroft, Universal vs. Territorial Models for Cross-Border Insolvency: The 
Theory, the Practice, and the Reality That Universalism Prevails, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 366, 368 (2008) 
(“[T]wo trends have emerged: the ‘universal’ approach and the ‘territorial’ approach.”). 
 206 In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 207 Howcroft, supra note 205, at 371. 
 208 Treco, 240 F.3d at 153; see also Howcroft, supra note 205, at 370 (“In its pure form, a universal 
approach dictates that other jurisdictions recognize the orders of the court overseeing the main jurisdictional 
proceedings.  This means that each time a jurisdiction embracing universalism is (a) implicated in a case and 
(b) is not the main jurisdiction, that jurisdiction must recognize the world-wide reach of the proceeding on foot 
in the main jurisdiction.”). 
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countries as well.209  These factors include comity, but particularly focus on 
the principle place of business of the insolvent institution.  The suggestion of 
this Article is only that regulators forcing resolutions ought to move in the 
same direction that courts are already headed in matters of bankruptcy.  
Congress also has insisted that the government, in resolving an institution, 
“shall coordinate, to the maximum extent possible, with the appropriate foreign 
financial authority regarding the orderly liquidation of any covered financial 
company that has assets or operations in a country other than the United 
States.”210 
 
 209 Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (now superseded by Chapter 15 of the Code), “enacted as part of 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, ‘was intended to deal with the complex and increasingly important 
problems involving the legal effect the United States courts will give to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.’”  
Treco, 240 F.3d at 153 (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir. 
1985)).  As the Treco court noted, § 304’s enactment was “a step toward the universality approach.”  Id. at 
154; see also Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317, 325 (2009) (“Since its 
enactment in 1978, the United States Bankruptcy Code has endorsed a universalist-type treatment of cross-
border insolvencies by encouraging cooperation with foreign bankruptcy courts.”).  It allowed “a foreign 
representative [to] commence an ancillary proceeding to assist the foreign proceeding” and “provid[ed] that a 
foreign representative may request injunctive relief, turnover, or ‘other appropriate relief’ in connection with a 
foreign proceeding.”  Francisco Vazquez, Cross-Border Bankruptcy Developments: The Movement Towards 
Universality in the United States, 2005 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 633, 636.  However, § 304 did “not require an 
extension of comity to all foreign proceedings or foreign countries” and was therefore characterized as 
adopting a “‘modified’ form of universality.”  Id.  Indeed, before relief would be deemed appropriate under 
§ 304, a foreign representative would have to establish that relief would: 
assure an economical and expeditions [sic] administration of such estate, consistent with— 
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; 
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in 
the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; 
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent disposition of property of such estate; 
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order 
prescribed by [the Bankruptcy Code]; 
(5) comity; and 
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such 
foreign proceeding concerns. 
Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000)). 
Although comity was a consideration under § 304, its hodgepodge of factors—along with the subjective nature 
of the term “comity” itself—stymied predictability.  See Kevin J. Beckering, United States Cross-Border 
Corporate Insolvency: The Impact of Chapter 15 on Comity and the New Legal Environment, 14 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 281, 296 (2008) (“[S]ection 304(c) cannot yield certain, or even predictable, results.”).  After all, 
“[o]ne judge’s balance of the interests of different States to achieve his/her understanding of justice will differ 
from the balance of another judge, and such variance is amplified by broad authority and flexibility.”  Id. 
 210 Dodd-Frank Act § 201(a)(N). 
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2. Capacity of the International System 
Prompted by three large international bank failures in 1974,211 the Central 
Bank Governors of the Group of Ten Countries (G-10), Luxembourg, and 
Switzerland agreed to establish the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
that year.212  The members declared that the primary purpose of the Committee 
would be to provide its members with a regular forum for airing cooperative 
approaches to the supervision of multinational banks.213  In addition to simply 
recognizing the need to coordinate supervision over multinational financial 
institutions, the Committee has been a model of insulated technocratic 
expertise, pursuing policies internationally that individual regulators might find 
impossible to implement domestically.  It also offers a system of monitoring to 
ensure that its members and other banking supervisors are actually 
implementing at home what they represented they would do in the Committee.  
This prospect of peer review and international technocratic insulation, in an 
already extant committee, is likely to provide the most realistic mechanism for 
stiffening the spine of would-be bureaucratic resolvers. 
Since its founding, the Basel Committee has served both as the venue for 
the exchange of information about supervisory practices and as the mechanism 
for the promulgation of hard standards to which all members of the Committee 
must subscribe.  It rotates its chairmanship and operates through consensus.214  
If limitations on leverage are instituted for the largest international players, 
they will probably come from Basel.215  And Basel has indicated that it wants 
to play a role in cross-border transactions.216 
 
 211 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 212 The Committee’s members come from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  See About the Basel 
Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 
2010). 
 213 See Press Communiqué, Bank for Int’l Settlements (Feb. 12, 1975) [hereinafter Press Communiqué] 
(on file with author); see also Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 415 n.1 (1994). 
 214 See TONY PORTER, STATES, MARKETS, AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 66 (1993); Joseph J. 
Norton, Privatization of Public Pension Systems in Developing Nations: A Call for International Standards, 64 
BROOK. L. REV. 817, 857 (1998). 
 215 Not least because the American leverage requirements are, while not nothing, statutorily required only 
at a ratio of 15:1.  See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113(a), 716. 
 216 This concern is emphasized in the Basel Committee’s Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
Border Bank Resolution Group, which was prepared in anticipation of the G-20 Summit Meeting.  See BASEL 
COMMITTEE, supra note 196. 
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In fact, financial regulators have already devised a robust international 
process to deal with the problems of financial market globalization.  This 
process has been called upon to support existing G-20 and other international 
initiatives.217  It has addressed capital requirements, increased regulation of 
credit rating agencies, convergence of regulations, OTC derivatives markets, 
cross-border supervisory colleges, and various other aspects of commonplace 
financial regulation. 
Moreover, the international networks of regulators offer something more 
than soft, easily avoidable rules (though they certainly do offer such rules).  
They also offer a respite from domestic politics and a competence-based 
international organization in which domestic regulators can focus on better 
rulemaking outside of the ambit of political control.218  In the domestic arena, 
congressmen may agitate for regulatory forbearance, and the politics facing 
regulators make it difficult for those regulators to pull the trigger.219 
In fact, there is already some sense that operating through Basel may offer 
a wider range of possibilities for revising financial regulation than would 
pursuing domestic reform: on the too big to fail problem, the Committee has 
suggested, for example, introducing leverage caps on banks.  American 
regulators have failed to propose a domestic cognate, despite the appeal of 
such caps.220 
With regard to resolution, moreover, the Basel Committee has already had 
something to say.221  It has proposed a “middle ground approach that 
 
 217 See Zaring, Crisis Performance, supra note 39, at 495–500 (discussing the G-20’s development as a 
priority-setting mechanism as one of the effects of the crisis). 
 218 And of course, the opportunity to avoid political pressures is one of the motivating reasons to create an 
agency.  See Eben Albert-Knopp, Note, The California Gas Charge and Beyond: Taxes and Fees in a 
Changing Climate, 32 VT. L. REV. 217, 222 (2007) (“[A]gencies are not directly beholden to any particular 
constituency and may thereby avoid some of the political pressure brought to bear on legislatures.”). 
 219 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the Basel 
Committee (Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives], available at 
http://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm; Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel Committee Issues 
Papers on Operational Risk (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090728.htm.  The Federal 
Reserve has not been able to, on its own, come up with new rules to impose leverage caps on banks, increase 
their capital adequacy, or change the way that their various kinds of capital are accounted for, such as capital 
based on residential mortgages without this sort of international help.  See David A. Moss, Lowering the Boom 
on Financial Leverage, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
david-a-moss/lowering-the-boom-on-fina_b_471472.html (discussing “[t]he struggle for financial regulatory 
reform in Washington”). 
 221 James Hamilton, Levitt, Volcker Stress Need for Resolution Authority for Large Financial Institutions; 
Basel Urges Cross-Border Framework, CCH FINANCIAL REFORM NEWS CENTER (Sept. 24, 2009, 4:23 PM), 
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recognizes the strong possibility of ring fencing in a crisis and helps ensure 
that home and host countries as well as financial institutions focus on needed 
resiliency within national borders.”222  The recommendations are rooted in 
fostering cooperation through “[g]reater convergence in national laws, by 
promoting a common understanding, more predictability, and reliable 
frameworks for responsive actions.”223  The Committee, to be sure, is by no 
means perfect, but the prescription in this Article does not depend upon perfect 
regulation from Basel. 
3. Operation of an International Approach 
The reason to resort to an international approach to resolution authority is 
not because the international institutions that would perform the task are so 
adept in matters of crisis response, whatever their merits as policymakers.224  
Indeed, as we saw during the last crisis, the Basel Committee decides and acts 
slowly, if at all, meaning that the Committee itself has little to say during fast-
moving events.225  Accordingly, as a Committee, although it may be relied 
upon to put some modest procedures in place for resolving future cross-border 
insolvencies (and, as it does so, this is the hook on which the 
internationalization of the resolution decision would lie),226 the advantage of 
international organization—in this case, at least—does not lie in tasking the 
decision about what to do with any particular bank to Basel.  That Committee, 
acting as a committee, is unlikely to be able to act; it is not itself a responsive, 
crisis-ready regulator, but rather a forum for the coordination of policymaking. 
But coordinating resolution authority through Basel exploits the advantage 
of the international forum without depending on the forum itself to act.  
(Indeed, Basel itself purports to be nothing more than a coordinator of the 
interests of its members.)227  It is also an insulator from domestic pressures, 




 222 BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 196, at 19. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Zaring, Crisis Performance, supra note 39, at 478 (“[I]nternational networks, such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
have not been the loci of any serious response to the crisis.”). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Initiatives, supra note 220. 
 227 Press Communiqué, supra note 213. 
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flexibility.228  On this understanding, it is the independence of the global stage, 
rather than the strength of the global institution, that makes it a good place for 
American regulators to actually use the regulation authority that they hold.229  
And so, in a crisis, one might expect the Federal Reserve to announce in Basel 
a coordinated decision to resolve a cross-border institution (such as Bear 
Stearns), with operations in a number of the jurisdictions overseen by members 
of the Committee in conjunction with their international counterparts.  The 
resolution could be guided by Basel’s principles for cross-border action and 
announced by American regulators in coordination with European and 
Japanese counterparts.  Basel here provides only substructure—the ability to 
coordinate and to hold regular meetings that ensure such coordination—that 
would remove the decision to resolve from the domestic context in which it has 
been exercised so rarely. 
This approach posits Basel, and international institutions more generally, as 
a safe harbor, where regulators can contemplate their mandates somewhat 
removed from the domestic political pressures that would shape those 
mandates.  It is not a perfect solution, but one that suggests that the 
technocratic basis for seizure of a large financial intermediary is best regarded 
not as a political and domestic decision, but an international one, requiring 
expert judgment and a degree of multinational coordination. 
Finally, an international solution to resolution authority might surpass a 
unilateral American approach for other more tangential reasons.  For instance, 
it might forestall the World Trade Organization from acting on the basis of a 
unilateral contribution of funds during the course of a resolution by 
coordinating it internationally.  And it might more generally foster the 
recognition that financial regulation is increasingly an international matter.230 
 
 228 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 427 (1988). 
 229 Indeed, the history of Basel is replete with examples of regulators acting in ways arguably inconsistent 
with the interests of their domestic industries; Japan’s willingness to accede to capital adequacy requirements 
that its banks did not meet is an example.  See DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING 
STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 53, 60–61 (2007). 
 230 The WTO law on subsidies governs any “financial contribution” made by or at the direction of “a 
government or any public body within the territory of a Member,” where certain conditions are met.  WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14.  A resolution process directed only at 
domestic firms, if it enabled those institutions to acquire capital more cheaply than their competitors, might 
count as a financial contribution in violation of the WTO’s subsidy disciplines, contingent upon, among other 
things, a showing of serious prejudice.  Id. art. 6.2. 
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4. Theory and Alternatives 
Of course, there are other more theoretical ways to stiffen the spine of 
American financial bureaucrats in cases where large institutions become 
increasingly obviously insolvent.  By positing that considered resolutions will 
most likely be made in the international arena, this Article suggests a doubling 
down on the merits of expertise and a turn away from straightforward reward- 
and punishment-based incentives that could also get regulators to act. 
For example, regulators could be incentivized to exercise their regulatory 
authority through domestic benefits; money or leisure rewards offer the 
classical incentive-based approaches.  Individual regulators could receive cash 
bonuses for implementing resolutions.  Agencies could be awarded larger 
budgets for acting to resolve troubled institutions.  Additional resources offer 
not just pecuniary benefits and a degree of prestige, but perhaps even the 
leisure of more employees to perform the same sort of job, and so on.  But 
bonuses for bankrupting financial intermediaries are incentives that would 
have to be carefully managed, lest they backfire.  Plus, they would probably 
depend on future congressional appropriations that are always uncertain.  The 
carrot might appear unrealistic indeed to regulators, who are told that they 
might be compensated for acting against institutions that are thought to have 
lobbying machines with sufficient resources in place as it is. 
The other similarly unrealistic way to persuade regulators to act involves 
punishment.  In theory, budgets could shrink after failures to resolve, or the 
powers to resolve could transfer to other agencies in the future.  There is little 
theoretical reason to believe that a credible threat of reorganization in the wake 
of a failure to resolve would not work on the principals of the financial 
regulatory agencies.  But in practice, the fear of punishment meted out by 
Congress or anyone else is limited. 
Instead, we usually see the opposite sorts of incentives in the real world for 
regulatory failure.  Budgets tend to grow at institutions that have failed to catch 
wrongdoers in the act.231  In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission—notably the ineffective overseers of the 
large investment banks that either collapsed or reorganized during this time—
 
 231 See, e.g., Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review, 29 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 397, 403 (2004) (“[I]t is difficult for politicians to credibly commit to rewarding or 
punishing agency performance ex post.”). 
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has seen its budget increased.232  And the problem is not just one at the agency 
level.  Civil service and protections make it difficult to fire employees for 
failing to exercise their resolution authority, so threats of “if they are not 
resolved, you are fired” would be difficult to implement.233  Accordingly, the 
firm-level examiners are unlikely to find the prospect of punishment 
particularly relevant should they fail to quickly and appropriately resolve 
insolvent institutions. 
In sum, because the stick does not seem to be any more realistic than some 
of the more straightforward carrots of bonuses or budget increases for 
successful exercises of resolution authority, actual use of resolution authority 
will depend on a broader view of the matters that motivate agencies.  One of 
the original bases for the exercise of political control is the value of 
independent and insulated expertise.234  The Federal Reserve, like most of the 
central banks of developed countries, has been designed to exercise a strong 
degree of independence from the political pressures of ordinary domestic 
politics in setting monetary policy.235  Further, the belief that independent 
expertise could matter is a traditional basis for bureaucratic regulation.  
Richard Stewart characterized this belief as coincident with the era of the 
founding of many regulatory agencies in administrative law.236  To be sure, in 
Stewart’s view (and the views of others ranging from George Stigler to Ralph 
Nader), modern agencies are as likely to be captured by regulated industry as 
to adequately realize their regulator missions.237  And despite the fact that 
stories about agency failure and capture are often more consistent with theory 
 
 232 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy11congbudgjust.pdf. 
 233 Federal employees may generally only be fired for cause, a difficult standard to meet.  See 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1934).  This standard has been written into the charters 
of financial regulators like the SEC.  Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 n.2 (2010) (“Although the SEC statute lacks explicit removal 
language, it is ‘commonly understood’ to include a ‘for cause’ removal limitation.”). 
 234 For examples of proponents of these views, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12–
20 (4th ed. 2007). 
 235 See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 15, 18 (2006) (describing the insulation of central banks, including the Federal Reserve, from 
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 236 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975) (discussing traditional model in which agencies were given independence and monitored to prevent 
illegal, rather than biased, actions). 
 237 See Joshua Green, Inside Man, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2010, at 36 (describing the Stigler and Nader schools 
of capture theory). 
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than with practice,238 it may be the case that the coziness of the relationship 
between the regulators and regulated, and the intensity of lobbying from 
Capitol Hill, have contributed to the unwillingness of regulators to act against 
insolvent financial intermediaries.239  If this is the case, the insulation from 
those sorts of pressures that results from the removal of the decision-making 
process to the global scene is probably the best way to get some more authority 
in place.  Indeed, Basel’s implemented system of peer review only bolsters its 
advantages in this regard. 
International interactions are no panacea, but they (1) can allow for the 
deployment of expertise, (2) can build capacity among domestic regulators, 
and (3) are somewhat isolated from the political process.240  While few doubt, 
for example, that national champions are hard to curb by national regulators 
acting alone, the international context may curb them.241  And more generally, 
Putnam’s work on the flexibility afforded by international interaction holds 
particularly true for the regulation of contagious problems like international 
finance.242 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is not only to offer technical solutions to problems 
of resolution authority but to think more generally about the systemic 
implications for governance and administration implicit in the power to 
destroy.  The government faces two problems when tasked with using that 
power. 
The first is that it will act destructively.  This Article has focused on the 
problem of overreach: the broad grant of power raises the threat that the 
government may go too far and nationalize viable institutions, wiping out their 
shareholders and removing their executives instantly and opaquely.  This sort 
of power—too much resolution authority—is daunting for regulated banks and 
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thrifts, and if applied to a broader, less well-defined set of institutions, could 
scare a broad swath of investors.  Corporate executives might worry about 
creating institutions that become so successful in the marketplace that they 
become systemically significant—and accordingly nationalizable.  Hence this 
Article proposes addressing the overreach cases through market solutions and 
pre-seizure notice and publication.243  The intuition is that if resolution 
authority is broadened beyond the limitations of the bank and thrift charters, 
some allowances must be made for the protection of those who risk 
overweening government intrusion on their nonetheless viable institutions. 
The second potential problem is that the government will not act.  And 
indeed, it has often failed to act in the past when it should have resolved 
insolvent institutions.  It has instead pursued the opposite course, permitting 
them to continue to ignore the usual constraints and to take risks in a bid to 
make it back to solvency.244  The failure to act is apparent from the 
government’s eschewing of PCA in the most recent crisis, as this Article has 
demonstrated. 
There is no ideal solution to the problem of getting the government to act 
when it must, but it may help to internationalize those questions of whether to 
resolve.  Internationalization would both insulate regulators from some of the 
pressures that may prevent them from exercising their resolution powers, and 
place them in the context of a forum in which the expertise of numerous 
financial overseers can inform particularly serious problems.  As Justice 
Brandeis recognized long ago, sometimes a technocratic approach is the best 
way to address particularly serious problems of government inaction because 
agencies can deploy skills that courts and legislatures cannot or will not use.245 
Resolution authority is a dramatic government act.  But a solution that 
embraces the values of international cooperation and the values of markets, in 
addition to commonsense domestic administrative procedures, would make for 
truly innovative financial regulation.  In fact, resolution authority might 
become a model for other forms of important economic regulation.  In this 
sense, it may act as a guide for other sorts of regulation in the future. 
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